One of the big stories from the Labour Party Conference, concerns the Prime Minister’s announcement of a Great British Grid. If the Guardian, that enthusiast for all things net zero and proponent of the rapid expansion of renewable energy, notes that some “call it just another quango”, then perhaps it’s not all it’s cracked up to be. The criticism is reproduced in what is, by Guardian standards when dealing with such topics, a reasonably balanced article. We are told:

One network industry source told the Guardian: “If they want to have more competition, that’s fine. But at the end of the day, we are all chasing the same supply chains and skilled contractors, and then we’re all using the same planning system. The pressures won’t be different if you use a different name.”

It also answers the question “…are electricity networks driving up the cost of energy?” thus:

In short: yes. After years of underinvestment, Great Britain’s ageing power grids are in need of a multibillion-pound overhaul to build new pylons and substations while rolling out thousands of miles of new power lines across the country.

The amount spent by network companies is controlled by the industry regulator for Great Britain, Ofgem, before the costs are recovered through our energy bills – and the sums are rising fast. Network companies are expected to spend between £70bn and £80bn between 2026 and 2030, and network investments of £89bn could be needed in the 2030s, according to Neso.

This means bill levies will rise, too. Power grid costs currently make up almost a quarter of household electricity bills – almost £210 on the average annual dual-fuel bill last year. Some analysts believe that could rise to £341 a year by 2030.

Worse still, it notes that the companies within the energy networks industry

are already tightly controlled by Ofgem, which approves all their spending and how it is collected from bills. It is also guided by the government-owned Neso, which has set out the roadmap for the government’s energy policies.

“If the government wants things to be different it is within their power to make changes,” the industry source added. “I don’t think spending £4bn in an industry already spending £70bn in the next few years will do much to change anything.”

Sam Richards, the chief executive of the pro-growth campaign group Britain Remade, accused Burnham of “setting up yet another quango” rather than “doing the serious work of bringing down bills” by reforming the market and the planning system.

“This is a sideshow,” he said. “Britain needs more competition and fewer barriers to new energy projects, not more government bureaucracy with a grand name.”

Pretty damning, then. So what do we actually know? The answer, I’m afraid, at this stage is not a lot. DESNZ has today issued a press release but it’s light on details, and the heading and sub-heading seem to have been written by a politician rather than by an engineer: “Great British Grid to speed up connections and cut bills – Families and businesses across the country will benefit from faster grid connections.”

It runs to just ten short paragraphs, with six further paragraphs under “Notes to editors”. We are promised “faster grid connections, greater energy security and lower costs”, but we aren’t really told how this will come about. We do learn that Great British Grid is to be a new publicly owned body “within” Great British Energy, and that it “will be able to invest in our electricity grid.”

In fairness to Andy Burnham, it’s not his fault that others chose to put the cart before the horse, nor that consequently gridlock has been an increasing and increasingly pressing problem. In fairness, too, he hasn’t had long to come up with a solution, but it doesn’t seem that he’s found one. Private investment (remember it’s never a cost, it’s always an investment) “will continue to play a vital role” but the “scale of the challenge” (it’s a challenge, not a glaring mess) “requires additional public investment and dedicated leadership”. That being the case, it seems only fair to ask what DESNZ and OFGEM have been doing and, for that matter, what has been the point of Great British Energy to date? And what form is this public investment and dedicated leadership to take? The press release doesn’t tell us how much public money is to be thrown at sorting out the mess, but as the Guardian has noted, the mooted figure of £4 billion, in the context of a spend of between £70bn and £80bn between 2026 and 2030, and network investments of £89bn in the 2030s doesn’t really amount to a row of beans. So it’s down to dedicated leadership, then? What does that amount to?

Great British Grid will bring together public and private investment to support the delivery of critical network infrastructure across the country. Working alongside existing network operators, it will help accelerate projects, increase competition and support the delivery of the grid upgrades needed to power Britain’s future.

We aren’t told how this will happen. Nor are we told how it will solve the problem that “…we are all chasing the same supply chains and skilled contractors…”. We’re told that the government is already working with NESO and Ofgem to reform the connections system, including overhauling the connections queue and removing more than 300 GW of speculative capacity, so this offers nothing new there. We’re told that further investment will be needed, but if the taxpayer can contribute a measly £4 Billion to a required figure that is well north of £100 Billion, we remain unenlightened. We’re told that “the government will also bring forward reforms to expand self-build connections”, but we don’t need a Great British Grid in order to implement those (self-build connection) reforms.

In addition:

The government will also accelerate the competitive tendering of transmission projects, allowing a wider range of organisations, including Great British Grid, to compete to deliver new network infrastructure. This will help drive innovation, improve delivery and secure better value for consumers.

Yet the Notes to editors make it clear that the role of existing network operators remains unchanged and that Great British Grid will complement, rather than replace, the existing institutions responsible for Britain’s energy system. Similarly Ofgem remains the independent economic regulator responsible for regulating the energy market and network companies, protecting consumers and ensuring value for money. NESO (National Energy System Operator) remains responsible for operating, planning and coordinating the electricity system. Also “We do not expect Great British’s Grid’s role to impact existing project commitments under the in-force and in-negotiation Ofgem licences.”

Finally, “The initial start-up costs for GBG will be covered by GBE’s existing budgets. As grid delivery has a long development time, the long-term budget for this expanded remit will be considered as part of a future spending review.”

Time will tell, I suppose, but this looks like a non-announcement to keep the faithful happy and to deflect from the failure of the government to achieve the reduction in energy bills that the Labour Party promised before the last general election. There seems to be little if any substance, and nothing that is talked about needed the creation of yet another Quango in order to achieve it. After all, don’t we already have a National Wealth Fund (the re-branded Infrastructure Bank)? It claims its strategy/mission is “to invest in capital-intensive infrastructure, supply chains and businesses across the UK, driving more than £100 billion of finance to unlock long-term economic growth and accelerate the transition to clean energy.”

Does the left hand know what the right hand is doing?

27 Comments

  3. Nils Pratley at the Guardian gives GBG a cautious thumbs-up, but it comes with many caveats:

    “Burnham’s electricity grid idea is interesting – but it’s not ‘public control’

    For all the talk, the real value of GB Grid lies in giving the regulator perfect data to drive down costs”

    https://www.theguardian.com/business/nils-pratley-on-finance/2026/sep/29/burnham-electricity-grid-idea-interesting-not-public-control

    Did share prices shudder as Andy Burnham unveiled Great British Grid (GBG) as a public sector challenger to the trio of private sector firms that own and operate the electricity grid? Not exactly. National Grid and SSE, the two listed in London, were down by about 0.5%, in line with the wider market.

    That mild reaction looks correct. For all the talk of greater public control over the electricity grid, the prime minister is not threatening to nationalise anything or take control of any existing assets. As the detail of the energy department’s announcement made clear: “Great British Grid will complement, rather than replace, the existing institutions responsible for Britain’s energy system and the role of existing network operators remains unchanged.”

    Instead, GBG’s main role will be to put together competing bids for future transmission projects. So, for example, rather than National Grid automatically getting the gig to build cables and pylons to bring offshore wind power from East Anglia to London, in future it could have to beat an offer from a consortium including GBG, probably in partnership with private sector construction firms and financiers.

    That prospect, however, is unlikely to alarm incumbent boardrooms because, to put it mildly, GBG will not arrive with terrifying sums of state money to blow everybody out of the water. GBG, said Burnham, will be “a branch” of Great British Energy (GBE) and, initially at least, will have to access its funding pot.

    That funding was £8.3bn for this parliament – and a chunk has already been raided to back small modular nuclear reactors. There is probably about £4bn left. If GBG gets half, we’re talking about £2bn of capital. For context, the grid upgrade in the 2026-31 cycle adds up to an investment programme of about £70bn, with much more to follow in the 2030s….

    …Note, though, that the concept of competitive tendering for transmission projects is not new. The so-called Cato (Competitively Appointed Transmission Owner) regime was established in an energy act in 2023 under the Tories. The only truly novel bit is that GBE, via its new “branch”, will join in.

    As a re-set of GBE’s priorities, that looks sensible. The upgrade of the electricity grid, at the lowest possible cost to consumers, is plainly of more national importance than the body’s current day job of installing solar panels on the roofs of schools and hospitals, which is good for ministerial photoshoots but does not move the economic dial. The behind-schedule grid programme, and the logjam in connections, threatens heavy extra costs, as the National Audit Office has pointed out….

    …None of [this], though, changes the big-picture criticism, repeated by industry and lobby groups endlessly, that energy infrastructure must get through the planning system faster.

    The mistake is to file these initiatives under “public control”. GBG may end up being a co-owner of a few projects but the vast majority of the grid will remain in the hands of the current triumvirate. And, on connections, the role of the state looks more like one of facilitator. That’s worth doing but the “control” element will sit roughly where it does today – with the current regulatory setup.

    Liked by 1 person

  4. The easier solution would be to put the generators we want where we want them, not allow speculators to build intermittent things wherever they want, and then stamp their feet demanding an extension cable so they can start getting paid for leccy we don’t need. Burnham wants to nationalise everything, so why not nationalise electricity development?

    Liked by 1 person

  6. “‘Concerning issues’ found at GB power grid by inquiry into cover-up claims

    Neso control room staff accused senior executives of covering up extent of blackout risks during June heatwave”

    https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/oct/19/concerning-issues-found-at-gb-power-grid-by-inquiry-into-cover-up-claims

    Independent investigators have found significant and concerning “cultural issues” at Great Britain’s grid operator after control room staff accused senior executives of covering up the extent of blackout risks in the UK during the June heatwave.

    An external legal firm tasked with investigating a series of whistleblower allegations against the National Energy System Operator (Neso) raised concerns over how high levels stress among control room engineers was handled by the company.

    The three-month investigation began after whistleblowers accused Neso of a cover-up over the growing risk of blackouts. They claimed the grid was becoming increasingly unmanageable, and that control room decisions were subject to “interference” by the company’s corporate affairs team to protect the reputation of the government-owned operator….

    …The law firm said that while it found “no evidence” of inappropriate influence over operational decisions, or that control room engineers were warned against leaving a paper trail of their efforts to stabilise the grid, the investigation found “cultural, governance and control issues” that were “significant findings in their own right”….

    …The grid woes were caused by near-record temperatures that caused demand for electricity to run air-conditioning systems to surge while a high pressure heat dome slowed wind turbines and prompted unplanned outages at gas and nuclear plants across Europe….

    Liked by 1 person

  7. More from Kathryn Porter on NESO:

    “NESO admits constraints breached and large forecast errors in interim grid security report”

    https://watt-logic.com/2026/10/20/neso-admits-errors-in-grid-security-report/

    She is reporting on some interesting and important developments, that were surely worthy of a large piece on the Guardian and BBC websites. Have you seen them there? I haven’t.

    On 19 October, two important reports were published concerning the events of 23 June, when the frequency of the GB electricity grid fell below its normal operating limits for an extended period and the National Energy System Operator (“NESO”) was forced to seek emergency assistance from neighbouring countries.

    The first was the final report of an independent investigation by Eversheds Sutherland into whistleblower allegations that NESO had deliberately avoided creating auditable records and that its Corporate Affairs function had interfered with operational decisions to protect the organisation’s reputation. The second was an update from Ofgem on its separate technical investigation into the operation of the electricity system during the June heatwave, accompanied by a detailed preliminary report prepared by a ringfenced team within NESO….

    …I have repeatedly criticised NESO’s demand forecasting capabilities (here and here). In my July analysis, I showed that forecast errors had increased substantially, with average day-ahead errors reaching around 800 MW during the first half of 2026 and individual errors exceeding 5 GW. These are very large errors relative to the capacity held to manage major system losses.

    Forecasting uncertainty and contingency requirements have to be managed together – if the system is short because demand has been underestimated, the reserve that would otherwise be available to respond to a generator or interconnector trip might already have been used. The fact that frequency deviations outside the operational limits are significant and growing may very well be a consequence of the deteriorating demand forecasts along with poor wind forecasting.

    The preliminary report confirms that actual demand exceeded day-ahead forecasts by over 2 GW during the June heatwave week (the largest errors on each day were Monday actual demand 1,846 MW higher than forecast, Tuesday actual demand 1,643 MW higher than forecast, Wednesday actual demand 2,055 MW higher than forecast, Thursday actual demand 2,087 MW higher than forecast, Friday actual demand 1,037 lower than forecast). The timing of the demand peak was also inaccurate by between 25 minutes and around an hour except on Friday when it was broadly in line with the expected time. Wind generation was at times 1,500 MW lower than expected, while a 5,000 MW discrepancy in generation availability data was identified (a difference between available generation notified via the Balancing Mechanism versus that notified via REMIT).

    These errors had a material impact on system margins.

    The problem is exacerbated due to the impact of embedded solar generation which appears as negative demand on the transmission system. NESO has to forecast not simply how much electricity consumers will use, but how much of that consumption will be met by generation behind the meter and therefore not appear as demand on the transmission system. During a sunny summer afternoon, embedded solar can significantly reduce apparent grid demand, but as solar output declines into the evening, that demand reappears. Underlying consumption may not have changed at all, but the transmission system must suddenly supply a much larger proportion of it. This makes the evening ramp increasingly important, even in summer.

    The first couple of weeks of October demonstrated a range of grid disruptions that are a further cause for concern. On 6 October wind output was low and an EMN was issued – the first of the winter after five were issued over the summer. NESO resolved the shortfall by breaching intraday trading limits on the interconnectors and paying £1,000 /MWh in the Balancing Mechanism.

    On the 9 October wind output was high yet frequency sagged consistently, dipping to 49.74 Hz and remaining below the operational limit for 9 consecutive minutes. NESO was forced to request Emergency Assistance from France and paid close to £700 /MWh in the BM.

    On 12 October again wind output was high, but NESO was unable to balance the grid in the SE England and was forced to request huge amounts of Emergency Assistance from France: 700 MW and then another 1,200 MW. These were record volumes. Demand that day was the highest of the winter to that point at 35.5 GW but still well below the 45 GW that can be expected on a typical midwinter’s day. NESO also paid £1000 /MWh in the BM.

    On 14 October it was windy, nothing tripped, demand was nothing special, but NESO blew through the intraday interconnector trading limits – NESO traded against the flow for 14 consecutive settlement periods (7 hours) with several hours at 2,700 MW (against the limit of 1,500 MW). The cost of balancing the day was just under £50 million against a daily average of £2.3 million. This was the most expensive day ever in the BM. Frequency that day went both above the upper operational limit and below the lower operational limit.

    On 15 October the trading limits were breached again. And again frequency went both above the upper operational limit and below the lower operational limit. Balancing costs were lower but still over £23 million – 10x the daily average….

    Can the grid be credibly described as secure?…

    The list of risk factors around system security is significant:

    • SORT, the balancing software dates back to the 1980s and should have been replaced years ago. When this system fails engineers revert to CLOGS which is a spreadsheet based tool
    • EDL/EDT the communications software that allows power stations to send technical parameters and Bid-Offer ladders to NESO and receive BM Acceptances and other instructions back is similarly old and subject to frequent outages – when these outages occur control room staff must revert to telephone instructions. This wasn’t difficult when the grid was dominated by a small number of large power stations with experienced operational staff. It is far harder now there grid contains thousands of small batteries many of which have no operational staff at all. This is made worse by issues with correct contact information not being provided to NESO, something that used to be maintained by the business continuity team whereas now generators are expected to proactively provide it
    • Spreadsheets are routinely used in the control room for margin calculations and important decision-making including relating to the issuance of margin and demand control warnings. They are also used to exchange certain information with market participants. Many process are highly manual which creates obvious risks
    • Standards around Grid Code compliance testing have fallen as evidenced by recent reports of windfarms having meters installed in reverse. MY FOI request last year into the progress of re-testing revealed that rather than re-testing all transmission-connected assets as planned, NESO had tested just 20 sites
    • NESO is not aware of the location of smaller assets on the grid. It also cannot see or control assets connected to low voltage networks. This makes demand forecasting harder as solar and batteries on low voltage grids materially impact transmission system demand. In summer excess solar causes disturbances on the transmission system that NESO cannot prevent
    • NESO is bad at forecasting. Both demand and wind forecasts are poor and deteriorating. These errors can be material and use up reserves leaving less or potentially none to cover the largest loss
    • The grid is increasingly reliant on imports which cannot be controlled or compelled. This summer NESO has used an Emergency Instruction to disconnect supplies to the Netherlands without agreement or notice. It also used Net Transfer Capacity restrictions to limit cross-border capacity limiting interconnector exports. NESO confirmed that these restrictions are used for operational reasons rather than simply security concerns, something that is not permitted for European TSOs. There are risks our neighbours may become unable (due to domestic shortages) or unwilling (due to cost or other concerns) to export to us, and the Government’s plans for dynamic alignment with the EU could force NESO to comply with the same rules as European TSOs removing its ability to use NTC restrictions
    • Meeting demand on low wind days is increasingly difficult. Without access to imports capacity margins would become extremely thin
    • High levels of wind generation can cause regional balancing challenges. A forecast for high wind output the following day causes the GB day ahead electricity price to be low, encouraging exports to Continental Europe. However, due to grid constraints it is hard to transport the electricity to the interconnectors in SE England – there are difficulties getting the electricity out of Scotland and other difficulties getting it into the SE England. This can force NESO to take emergency actions on interconnectors and breach trading limits as it seeks to halt or reverse exports to avoid imbalances in the SE region
    • Transmission assets are aging – 30% of switchgear, almost two thirds of overhead lines and just over a third of transformers were built prior to 1980 and are more than 45 years old
    • Falling levels of inertia are creating stability challenges. The Eversheds report heard that “the challenges of the net zero transition… noting that conventional generation had been easier to manage because of better system inertia, whereas increased reliance on renewables, which are less flexible, makes the job more difficult”
    • Reserves may exist on paper but not be physically deliverable for example ramping rates, minimum stable generation levels, temperature-related derating and transmission constraints all affect how much capacity is genuinely available
    • While low inertia increases the initial rate of frequency change following a disturbance, the system also needs enough fast frequency response to arrest that change and slower reserves to restore frequency. Batteries can provide extremely fast response, but their contribution depends on available power, state of charge, control settings and how much response has already been activated. There are questions about whether the system can remain secure against a further major loss after responding to a disturbance
    • Replacing conventional generation with inverter-based generation can reduce voltage security as seen in Iberia last year. Long-distance power transfers and heavily loaded transmission circuits also make voltage management more difficult. Voltage instability can develop even when aggregate generation is enough to meet demand
    • A system can appear secure under normal operating conditions but become unstable when multiple inverter-based resources disconnect in response to a disturbance. Protection settings, frequency and voltage ride-through behaviour, and the interaction between different manufacturers’ controls need to be understood and tested – these issues were also observed in the Iberian blackout
    • As conventional power stations close, the availability and geographical distribution of restoration (black start) resources change. Restoring a system containing large numbers of inverter-based generators, batteries and distributed assets may require different procedures and capabilities, and the process contains more uncertainties due to the difficulties forecasting distribution-connected solar and battery behaviour as well as underlying demand. If regional demand is incorrectly estimated by too large an amount the grid will immediately trip when load is reconnected, and if the error is very large there is a risk of equipment damage that would threaten the ability to repeat the attempt
    • The Eversheds report identified organisational risks within NESO including pressure on engineers, weaknesses in record-keeping, and concerns about communication between the control room and senior management. The report identified “a culture in which experienced operatives have either left or disengaged from raising concerns”
    • There are growing concerns over cyber security and the potential for disruption either by hostile states or by individual bad actors. Shared telecoms infrastructure, software dependencies, cyber incidents and failures of backup arrangements could all affect the control room’s ability to observe and control the grid. The June 2025 EDL/EDT disruption which was caused by damage to the communications cables rather than a software issue illustrates the vulnerabilities affecting primary and secondary communications methods
    • There is high reliance on the gas fleet particularly in low wind conditions, however much of the fleet is aging. A third of the large gas generators were built in the 1990s and another third in the 2000s, with the older units approaching end of life. Several report expected decommissioning dates in the late 2020s/early 2030s, and one – South Humber Bank unit 1 may actually have already closed without anyone realising. It last generated on 3 April and has submitted a REMIT notice of a planned outage until 2043 while the company accounts say it is expected to decommission in 2029. It may well be this plant has already generated its last MWs
    • As more generation and storage connects to distribution networks, local voltage fluctuations and interactions between inverter controls and protection systems may become harder to manage. NESO has limited visibility of these assets, creating risks that disturbances originating on distribution networks could affect the transmission system, while transmission-level disturbances could trigger unexpected responses from large numbers of distributed assets
    • As the grid becomes more reliant on weather-based generation, weather risks will increasingly compound. Cold weather drives high demand in winter but is also associated with low wind output. High temperatures can coincide with low wind output, while lowering the efficiency of thermal and solar generation and increasing line and transformer losses. Transformers are also at higher risk of catching fire – UK transformers are not rated to high temperatures in the way those located in hotter countries are. With several of out neighbouring countries also relying on wind, high weather correlation can threaten the availability of imports at the time they are most needed ie when wind output in GB is low

    …It’s not scaremongering to worry about blackouts when there’s such a long list of identifiable risks to the security of the electricity system, particularly when several of those risks have already materialised. Nobody is suggesting a blackout is inevitable, but neither is it reasonable to dismiss the possibility simply because the lights have stayed on so far. Electricity system security is about ensuring the grid can withstand credible failures, not celebrating the fact that no such failure happened yet….

    …The pursuit of Clean Power 2030 is diverting attention away from addressing many of the challenges faced by the grid, with issues relating to legacy systems being most at risk of being overlooked.

    Yesterday’s reports identify some very serious concerns about how NESO is managing the grid. It’s time Ofgem and DESNZ, and Michael Shanks set aside their complacency and considered the real threats we face to electricity security, not least because the consequences of failure would be very severe.

    Liked by 1 person

  8. My apologies to the Guardian (but not to the BBC):

    “‘Concerning issues’ found at GB power grid by inquiry into cover-up claims

    Neso control room staff accused senior executives of covering up extent of blackout risks during June heatwave”

    https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/oct/19/concerning-issues-found-at-gb-power-grid-by-inquiry-into-cover-up-claims

    Independent investigators have found significant and concerning “cultural issues” at Great Britain’s grid operator after control room staff accused senior executives of covering up the extent of blackout risks in the UK during the June heatwave.

    An external legal firm tasked with investigating a series of whistleblower allegations against the National Energy System Operator (Neso) raised concerns over how high levels stress among control room engineers was handled by the company.

    The three-month investigation began after whistleblowers accused Neso of a cover-up over the growing risk of blackouts. They claimed the grid was becoming increasingly unmanageable, and that control room decisions were subject to “interference” by the company’s corporate affairs team to protect the reputation of the government-owned operator….

    Like

  10. “Grid operator says lights will stay on this winter after concerns”

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmy56q2n1veqo

    The body in charge of Britain’s electricity network has given assurances that the lights will stay on this winter after concerns were raised by some of its engineers.

    The National Energy System Operator (NESO) said the country’s electricity system was prepared and “resilient to the challenges it may face” during the colder months.

    However, its winter outlook report comes after an independent investigation found engineers had “high levels of stress and concern” about their ability to ensure adequate supply due to differences between renewable and gas-fired power generation.

    NESO said supplies were expected to remain secure throughout the winter, though warned there could be “tight days”.

    It added that such days would result in it deploying notices to power producers that additional electricity generation may be needed. It said such an announcement was not a warning of power cuts and was routine…..

    Liked by 2 people

  11. “This winter’s safeguard figure was calculated using a different methodology to last year’s. The new methodology assigns a higher level of reliability to wind farms.”

    -The Telegraph, today

    Like

  12. “This winter’s safeguard figure was calculated using a different methodology to last year’s. The new methodology assigns a higher level of reliability to wind farms.”

    That’s OK then. All will be well…..

    Liked by 1 person

  13. Blocked by The Telegraph, but found this – Blackout warning: Britain’s winter power safety margin falls to four-year low

    Some quotes –

    “Electricity Imports Are Part Of The Winter Plan – Neso’s forecast also relies on Britain being able to draw electricity from neighbouring European countries when domestic demand is particularly high. On the coldest days, without electricity imports from the Continent, the projected safety margin could be eliminated. This reliance on interconnection means conditions in neighbouring electricity markets can also matter when Britain faces periods of high demand.”

    “Government Cannot Rule Out Blackouts – Jonathan Brearley, permanent secretary at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, told MPs that the government could not guarantee that power cuts would never occur. “We can never guarantee the lights won’t go out,” he told the Public Accounts Committee. He added that every electricity system faced risks. The comments came after an independent report raised concerns among Neso control-room engineers about managing the electricity network during the transition towards renewable energy.”

    “Higher Demand Is Adding Pressure – Electricity consumption is rising as more parts of the economy move away from fossil fuels. The growth of electric vehicles and heat pumps is adding household electricity demand. Large data centres are another source of growing consumption as investment in digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence expands. At the same time, Britain’s electricity system is undergoing a major shift towards renewable generation. The combination means the country needs enough generation, network capacity and interconnection to cope with periods when electricity demand is particularly high.”

    Particularly liked “We can never guarantee the lights won’t go out,” bit. It makes it sound like a minor inconvenience. OK, it is a common expression for a total power outage, but I would expect Jonathan Brearley, permanent secretary at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero to spell that out. Maybe he did, but can’t be bothered to dig deeper at the moment

    Like

  15. Mark – the link works, thanks. Shame I can’t read the comments, bet they were interesting 🙂

    Like

  16. dfhunter; as you probably know, Brearley has history – and skin in the game. From AI:

    “At the former Department of Energy and Climate Change, he helped lead electricity-market reform; earlier, he led work on developing the Climate Change Act. He became chief executive of Ofgem in February 2020, leading Great Britain’s energy regulator through the pandemic and the energy-price crisis. In March 2026, he left Ofgem to become Permanent Secretary at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, where he leads the department.”

    He has been directly involved in our energy fiasco so carries a lot of responsibility for the parlous state we are now in.

    Liked by 1 person

  19. Mark – thanks for the link back, missed that post at the time as on hols in Aug 2023.

    Liked this quote from near the top – “Ofgem says – We are responsible for: working with government, industry and consumer groups to deliver a net-zero economy, at the lowest cost to consumers“.

    Suppose they/he can claim success 3yrs on, as everything is working to plan (sarc)

    Like

  20. “NESO winter outlook flattered by optimistic assumptions and new methodology”

    https://watt-logic.com/2026/10/27/neso-winter-outlook-flattered-by-optimistic-assumptions-and-a-methodology-change/

    The National Energy System Operator (“NESO”) has published its Winter Outlook for 2026/27, offering what appears to be a reassuring assessment of Britain’s electricity security. It expects enough generating capacity or imports to meet demand, with a de-rated capacity margin of 5.9 GW, equivalent to 9.5% of average cold spell peak demand, and a loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) below 0.1 hours per year.

    That’s comfortably within the Government’s reliability standard of three hours per year, and only slightly lower than last winter’s spare margin of 6.1 GW.

    Unfortunately it looks more like wishful thinking than a serious analysis of the true security risks this winter. Given NESO’s own engineers struggle to confirm whether the largest loss was covered on 23 June either in real time or subsequently, we’re entitled to take this analysis with a large dose of scepticism. NESO has changed the way it calculates the contribution of wind generation, increasing the amount of firm capacity attributed to the wind fleet. Its assessment also assumes significant electricity imports during periods of system stress, including from Ireland, a market which is normally dependent on imports from Great Britain.

    Adjusting for the change in methodology and removing the assumed Irish contribution produces a far smaller margin of around 0.5 GW….

    ….It’s clear, and Slye admitted as much, that “other priorities” such as the drive to Clean Power 2030 and Net Zero 2050 have diverted attention and resources away from the fundamentals of security of supply. An important step in correcting this failure would be to stop issuing platitudes and start communicating with greater honesty and transparency the true strength of the grid.

    In terms of the Winter Outlook this means presenting more rigorous scenario analyses that set out the risks, recognising that risks might coincide.

    Liked by 1 person

  23. dfhunter,

    I have little doubt that the Government is planning for blackouts. What will cause them is the big question.

    Liked by 2 people

  24. Mark – I agree. The UK is so vulnerable to power outages that almost anything could trigger one or more. Think we, on this blog, have often thought that power cuts/outages might be the only way to bring home to the public the madness of NZ, which could not be ignored by policy makers.

    I thought things would never get to this situation this quickly. The old adage “be careful what you wish for” seems apt.

    See Jaime has a post – (1) A Critical Look At Barnes et al, ‘Heat-Related Urban Mortality Attributable To Human-Induced Climate Change In Europe From 2000 To 2025’

    Wonder if anybody can be bothered to do this study I propose –

    “winter cold deaths caused by NZ policies driven by man-made climate change madness has killed hundreds of thousands of people in the UK”

    Like

  25. “NESO is Playing With Fire

    Disconnected leadership and statistical sophistry putting energy security at risk.”

    https://davidturver.substack.com/p/neso-is-playing-with-fire

    Well worth reading the whole thing. Conclusions?

    Although technically exonerated by Eversheds Sutherland, NESO was effectively castigated by the investigation into the whistleblower allegations. Staff are concerned that the grid is becoming much more difficult to manage and management is disconnected from and clueless about the challenges of keeping the lights on. Empirical analysis shows that grid frequency volatility is increasing as grid inertia is falling, confirming the anecdotal opinions of the witnesses to the investigation.

    In addition, the Winter Outlook appears to be a rose-tinted view of the risks to security of supply with sophisticated statistical methods being used to justify an increase in the de-rating factors for wind power. Despite that, the evidence shows that at times of high demand, the minimum wind output can fall far below the de-rated capacity, more than NESO’s sensitivity analysis allows for. There are also real risks that NESO have been too optimistic about import capacity over the interconnectors. At times of grid stress because of high demand and low wind, there will be demands to export to the island of Ireland and imports from the Continent may well be impaired by the same low wind conditions. There are also additional risks from fragile gas supplies.

    The reality is that wind output is random and not correlated to demand. A far better approach to assessing security of supply would be to consider a realistic worst-case scenario – peak demand over 45GW, extended Dunkelflaute for a period of seven days where wind generation remains in the 2-5GW range, exports to Ireland are required and interconnector imports are impaired by the same low wind conditions. It would be helpful for the regulator to ask NESO: “What firm capacity do we need in that scenario and how would NESO cope?” I think we know the answer to that; NESO is playing with fire.

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  26. Another excellent article by David Turver which backs up the points made by Kathryn Porter.

    There are a couple more flies in the ointment which are not mentioned specifically:

    Gas supplies – the “fragility” could be made worse by the imminent termination of the EU’s purchases of Russian LNG. AI says: “for the EU, Russian LNG supplied roughly 6% of its total natural-gas demand in 2025…… That’s LNG specifically; all Russian gas, including pipeline gas, was about 10% of EU demand that year.”

    Norwegian power exports – we take up to 1.4 GW from Norway but their total exports to us and Europe amount to around 6 GW. If they curtail those exports, we are likely to find that our neighbours’ capacity to supply us is also reduced.

    Overall it looks pretty grim.

    Liked by 2 people

  27. “Britain’s electricity grid: are we confusing keeping the lights on with keeping the system secure?“

    https://watt-logic.com/2026/11/05/david-gunn-memorial-lecture/

    Excellent from Kathryn Porter, as always:

    Security must be treated as a primary design requirement, not an inconvenient constraint on policy.

    First, NESO needs modern operational systems. Critical calculations should be performed within controlled, validated software rather than relying on manually maintained spreadsheets. Communications infrastructure and fallback arrangements must be robust enough for a system containing thousands of increasingly automated assets.

    Second, forecasting and visibility must improve. NESO needs better real-time information about distributed generation, storage and demand. The growing influence of low-voltage assets cannot remain largely invisible to the national system operator.

    Third, the physical security of the system must be independently demonstrated. That means adequate and deliverable reserves, sufficient frequency response, voltage stability, appropriate inertia or equivalent services, and comprehensive testing of generator behaviour.

    Fourth, electricity import assumptions must be realistic. We should recognise the value of interconnection without treating imports as guaranteed capacity.

    Fifth, the reliability of conventional generation must be taken seriously. The system will continue to need dispatchable capacity, particularly during periods of low wind. We must ensure that the capacity counted in security assessments will actually be available when needed.

    Sixth, restoration capability must be tested against the electricity system we are building, not merely the system we used to have.

    And finally, NESO needs a culture in which engineers can raise concerns and issue operational warnings without fear of embarrassing senior management. That requires effective independent oversight and genuine accountability.

    I began by asking whether we are confusing keeping the lights on with keeping the electricity system secure.

    I believe that distinction has become dangerously blurred. The events of 23 June exposed serious questions about reserves, transmission constraints, operational procedures and the adequacy of the tools available to control-room engineers. The reports published this week have not resolved those questions – In some respects, they have made them more pressing. And the incidents so far in October demonstrate that the difficulties are not confined to the summer heatwaves.

    Britain’s electricity system is undergoing an enormous transformation. And the system operator is being asked to manage this increasingly complex network using some infrastructure and processes that are long overdue for replacement.

    We must not mistake a lack of blackouts for proof the risks have been adequately controlled. If we wait until a serious blackout to discover that those standards were not being met, we will have waited too long – people may die as they did in last year’s Iberian blackout. With so many identifiable risks, worrying about blackouts is not scaremongering.

    Dismissing those concerns without properly addressing them is the bigger danger.

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