Responding to a comment on an article in the Spectator recently I stumbled over a surprising puzzle – or, as it turned out, two surprising puzzles. I was discussing how a substantial proportion, probably most, of China’s coal is used for electricity generation and the extent to which it’s being reduced by the introduction of renewables. So far, it seemed, so straightforward.

China’s overall coal consumption is massive – over half of global consumption.ⁱ And, as most coal is apparently used for electricity generation where its share was declining, it seemed quite likely that the overall level of consumption would also be declining. However the Our World in Data (OWID) chart linked above (endnote 1) shows that’s not the case: total consumption increased up to 2024, levelling out (albeit with a tiny increase) in 2025 at 25,621.83 TWh. (It’s important to note that when OWID uses TWh here it’s referring to a unit of energy and not to electricity generation.) That was unexpected: why was coal consumption not declining when most was used for electricity generation and that was being replaced by renewables? It seemed to me that the answer was possibly a combination of an increase in overall electricity generation with coal’s use increasing in absolute terms and an increase in coal’s use in non-electricity applications such as steel and cement production.

Was that correct?

To put this into perspective, I thought that first it would be useful to investigate what proportion of China’s coal consumption is used for electricity and what for industrial and other applications. And, with the help of ChatGPT, I found that the International Energy Authority (IEA) has the answer: its 2026 Global Energy Review put Chinese coal demand in 2025 at around 5 billion tonnes (which relates nicely to the OWID TWh figure) – 3 for electricity generation (and some heat) and 2 for industrial and other uses.ⁱⁱ In other words, the electricity/other split is about 60/40 (if heat is excluded from the electricity figure). But it didn’t explain to what extent coal’s reduced percentage share of electricity generation was offset by its expansion in absolute terms and to what extent (if any) it could be accounted for by coal’s greater use for non-electricity applications.

And once again IEA has the answer: in 2024 total coal consumption increased largely because coal-fired generation rose in absolute terms although not in percentage terms; ⁱⁱⁱ and in 2025 total coal consumption levelled off because, although coal-fired generation fell in absolute terms and coal’s use for steel and cement production also fell, an increased use of coal in the chemical/plastics-sector was just sufficient to offset these declines.^iv

Again so far so (reasonably) clear.

But then something surprising and extraordinary occurred: it was reported that China had introduced 78 GW of new coal-power capacity this year with another 313 GW of new coal plants in the pipeline.^v (Note: it’s clear from the GEM report on which Jo Nova bases her report that this new capacity is for ‘power’ i.e. electricity.) Why would China need nearly 400 GW of additional coal-fired electricity generating capacity when coal’s share of electricity generation was declining?

So back to ChatGPT: could it help me to unravel this mystery?

It began by suggesting two possible answers:

(1) China is determined not to repeat the serious electricity shortages it experienced in 2021-2022. Hence new coal plants were approved and the fact that they’re becoming reality now is a legacy of that problem.^vi

(2) China is redefining the essential role of coal from baseload generation to system integrity (backup) and security.

But, although (1) seemed plausible (although hardly a reason why China would need quite so much additional capacity), it seemed (2) was being undermined by the reality that, although China increasingly intends new coal capacity to provide system security, market arrangements and long-term contracts were causing some coal plants to continue operating in relatively traditional generation patterns, thereby probably contributing to another surprising recent report in Western journals:

Just a few weeks ago an estimated 360 TWh of China’s wind and solar power has been curtailed.^vii

So we have an extraordinary situation: China is currently commissioning vast amounts of both renewable and potential coal generation – and at the same time it seems it’s being forced to abandon a substantial share of new renewables because the system cannot accommodate them.

Putting this to one side for the time being, I returned to my other concern: why hasn’t China abandoned the 291 GW coal capacity that’s in the pipeline? (Note: GEM suggests the real figure might in reality be over 500 GW.^viii) As noted above surely 291 GW is much more than might still be necessary to overcome the 2021-2022 problem or for use for electricity generation backup? But it hasn’t abandoned it. And as a result, although coal consumption is static, capacity is growing. Why is China encouraging this?

I thought it would help to understand this if I were to investigate the scale of the problem by finding out by how much China’s annual coal consumption (25,621 TWh) would be increased if the whole of the potential 400 GW of capacity were to become operational (in practice very unlikely). Here’s the answer:

If for example the 400 GW operated at an average utilisation of 50%, it would generate about 1,752 TWh of electricity per year (400 GW × 8,760 hours × 50%). And, assuming the coal plants operate at an average efficiency of 40%, producing that electricity would require about 4,380 TWh of coal energy (1,752 ÷ 0.40). Therefore China’s already enormous coal consumption would be increased by about 17% – a very substantial increase.

But in any case, however it’s deployed – for what purpose and at what utilisation – 400 GW is a huge and significant addition to China’s coal potential. Why on earth does China believe it needs all this additional power? That’s one of the puzzles with which I’m struggling.

ChatGPT suggested that part of the answer might be that coal plants ‘have powerful institutional and economic supporters’ plus an element of ‘simple institutional momentum’. Well maybe – but that obviously doesn’t explain why China’s introducing so much new coal-fired capacity just as it’s becoming less dependent on coal for generating electricity.

So what is going on?

At this point I wondered about the relevance (if any) to this of the curtailing of 360 TWh of renewable electricity mentioned above. Like the new coal power capacity its scale is significant: in the first six months of this year the equivalent of about 29% of China’s entire wind-and-solar generation in the first six months of 2025 (1,250 TWh ^ix) was curtailed. This is extraordinary: coal powered generation and capacity are being increased while a huge amount of the renewable energy recently commissioned is being cancelled.^x And that’s despite an earlier official decision to reduce coal consumption while increasing ‘clean’ energy.^xi It makes no sense.

What it seems is happening is that China’s grid is unable to accommodate the enormous amount of renewable energy that’s being created as well as increased coal generation. In other words, in trying to build a hybrid electricity system, it’s ending up with a mess: plenty of generation but insufficient transmission, storage and flexibility to make it work. And it’s a mess caused by the introduction of renewables – a problem with which we’re increasingly familiar in Britain. And, as in Britain, the authorities have apparently only just discovered that they must take account of something not envisaged by their detailed planning for rapid renewable expansion: the huge renewable build-out is creating substantial integration and intermittency difficulties.

So here’s the other puzzle with which I’m struggling: is this a temporary problem that can be relatively easily resolved; or is it a structural problem that strikes at the heart of China’s critically important energy system? These are important (and unanswered) questions – but not I think relevant to the other big question: why do the Chinese authorities think it necessary to build an enormous amount of new coal capacity? Indeed in normal circumstances these questions might be a compelling reason for not creating new coal power capacity. To repeat my earlier question: why is this additional capacity now deemed necessary – contrary to both reported official policy and to the new problem of inadequate grid integration?

I suspect one possible answer is that it’s needed to ensure energy security in the face of a major geopolitical crisis – possibly (but not necessarily) triggered by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Coal is uniquely suitable for this: China can produce enormous quantities of it domestically, it can easily stockpile it (if necessary for a long time) and China’s coal power know-how is especially mature. Moreover China is rapidly building some highly efficient coal fired power plants.^xii The fact that these plants have been described officially as providing security, flexibility and system resilience rather than simply baseload electricity and system support may be evidence supporting the geopolitical crisis theory.

But of course that’s only a theory and what’s happening, although surprising, may be no more than a mundane need to avoid a repetition of the 2021-2022 blackouts and/or for potential backup for all those additional renewables or simply to enhance China’s ability to cope with increased future energy demand.

I cannot see any way of determining which (if any) of these possibilities is the answer and, as with the renewable curtailment problem, I think only time will tell.

So we have two unresolved puzzles. And frustratingly it seems we’ll have to wait for an answer to both.

Endnotes:

i http://tiny.cc/bo79101

ii https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-2025/demand?utm_source=chatgpt.com

iii https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2025/coal?utm_source=chatgpt.com

iv https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2026/coal?utm_source=chatgpt.com

v https://joannenova.com.au/2026/08/chinas-coal-boom-is-roaring-back-78gw-of-new-coal-plants-last-year-is-the-highest-for-18-years/

vi https://globalenergymonitor.org/sites/default/files/migration/reports/CREA_GEM_China_Coal-power_H2-2025_3.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

vii https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-leads-wave-clean-power-wastage-grids-globally-hit-limits-2026-08-17/

viii https://globalenergymonitor.org/article/world-using-less-coal-even-it-builds-more?utm_source=chatgpt.com

ix https://technode.com/2026/07/30/chinas-renewable-energy-generation-surpasses-40-of-total-power-output-for-first-time-in-h1-2026/

x https://globalenergymonitor.org/article/china-wasted-enough-wind-and-solar-cover-all-new-power-demand-h1-2026?utm_source=chatgpt.com

xi https://www.nea.gov.cn/20251222/66a44a06b779474684d365aa79e50380/c.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com (In Chinese: translation should be possible via your browser).

xii https://joannenova.com.au/2026/08/say-what-china-is-building-ultra-super-critical-coal-fired-power-plants-in-just-three-years/