The International Energy Agency (IEA) was founded in 1974, in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with a brief (as Wikipedia puts it) “to avoid future shocks by helping to ensure reliable energy supplies, promote energy efficiency, ensure energy security and encourage technological research and innovation.” It began with 16 founding member countries, and has since expanded to 31 (predominantly – but not exclusively, as that number includes Japan and South Korea – European or North American states). All full member countries must be members of the OECD. The 13 Association countries are predominantly (but not exclusively) developing countries (at least as defined by the various UN COP Treaties), and include the likes of China, Indonesia, India and Brazil. The IEA is therefore nothing to do with the United Nations, and while its reports may carry a high status, it is arguably not the authoritative international body that many assume it to be (for example, for some reason, the BBC reports on it as being “the global energy watchdog”). There is an argument that half a century since its formation, it is now a cheerleader for renewable energy and for net zero. A quick look at its website creates that impression in my mind, in any event.

This week saw the publication of the latest of the IEA’s World Energy Outlook reports, this one being for 2024. This annual event is, as always, eagerly seized upon by the likes of the Guardian, whose headline (“Fossil fuels could become cheaper and more abundant, says IEA; International Energy Agency says transition to clean energy means there will be a surplus of oil, gas and coal”) rather surprised me, given that of all the things to take away from the report, one might have thought that good news for fossil fuel users wouldn’t be something they would seek to highlight. After all, it is only one point among very many indeed in a document that runs to almost 400 pages. And yet, the Guardian article commences thus:

Fossil fuels could soon become significantly cheaper and more abundant as governments accelerate the transition to clean energy towards the end of the decade, according to the International Energy Agency.

The world’s energy watchdog has signalled a new energy era in which countries have access to more oil, gas and coal than needed to fuel their economic growth, leading to lower prices for households and businesses.

The Paris-based agency’s influential annual outlook report found that energy consumers could expect some “breathing space” from recent spikes in global oil and gas prices triggered by geopolitical upheavals because investment in new fossil fuel projects has outpaced the world’s demand.

At almost 400 pages, however, the publication is far too long to report on in any detail, so I confine myself to making observations about those early parts of the report that are of interest to a climate and energy sceptic. I cheerfully admit to cherry-picking from the document, since the parts I omit will no doubt be pushed by the usual suspects, keen to promote the endlessly optimistic narrative around renewables that seems to be the IEA’s main purpose these days. I find the report to be most useful where it reports on what has already happened, rather than where it forecasts what is to happen, since only the former is truly meaningful, especially given the uncertainties around forecasting, which even the IEA repeatedly acknowledges within the body of the report.

The second paragraph of the introduction is something every sceptic could agree with:

Today, the greatest energy injustice is the hundreds of millions of people, mostly in Africa, who still lack access to basic energy services such as electricity or safe stoves for cooking.

Why then, cries the sceptic, give them access to cheap and reliable fossil fuels, rather than insist on them going down the expensive renewables route. For renewables are expensive, and this is certainly a problem for the developing world. At page 20, we are told:

Dividing lines are emerging on energy and climate, which can only be bridged if there is more help provided to poorer countries, communities and households to manage the upfront costs of change, including much greater international support. High financing costs and project risks are limiting the spread of cost-competitive clean energy technologies to where they are needed most, especially in developing economies where they can deliver the biggest returns for sustainable development and affordability. Lack of access to modern energy is the most fundamental inequity in today’s energy system, with 750 million people – predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa – remaining without access to electricity and more than 2 billion without clean cooking fuels.

This is particularly problematic, because (as we are told at page 17) “…the largest sources of rising demand for energy are, in descending order, India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa…”. Perhaps they will overtake China, which has been in the forefront of energy demand lately. At page 18, we are advised that “…two-thirds of the global increase in electricity demand over the last ten years [has come] from China…”.

So rapid is the rise in demand for more electricity, that it is already projected by 2035 to be 6% higher than the IEA was projecting by that date just 12 months ago. But back to Asia. Still on page 18 we learn:

China has been the engine of oil market growth in recent decades, but that engine is now switching over to electricity: the country’s oil use for road transport is projected to decline in the STEPS [the Stated Policies Scenario], although offset by a large increase in oil use as a petrochemical feedstock. India becomes the main source of oil demand growth, adding almost 2 million barrels per day (mb/d) to 2035…

At page 19, the IEA says it expects “…importers in Asia… face a long-term rise in their dependence on oil and gas imports to nearly 90% for oil and around 60% for gas by 2050…”.

On page 20 we learn of more problems associated with renewables:

At the moment, for every dollar spent on renewable power, 60 cents are spent on grids and storage. By the 2040s, this reaches parity in all scenarios. Many power systems are vulnerable to an increase in extreme weather events and cyberattacks, putting a premium on adequate investments in resilience and digital security.

Despite that, the IEA manages, with a straight face (still on page 20) after a paragraph warning us of terrible consequences if (as they project) world temperatures will rise by 2.4C by 2100, to tell us that “…clean technologies that are increasingly cost-effective today are set to remain so, with greatly reduced exposure to the vagaries of commodity markets and lasting benefits for people and planet.”

Another summary ends on page 21 with what must surely (for the IEA and its acolytes) be a depressing conclusion:

The share of clean energy investment in emerging market and developing economies outside of China remains stuck at 15% of the total, even though these economies account for two-thirds of the global population and one-third of global GDP. A range of new business models and a policy push in some countries ensure that an additional 550 million people gain access to clean cooking and nearly 200 million to electricity in the STEPS between 2023 and 2030. This still falls well short of universal access goals.

Moving on to page 24, we embark on a more detailed analysis, beyond summary bullet points and headlines. The contrast between the developed, and developing, worlds could not be starker with regard to energy demand:

The last decade has seen the share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix gradually come down from 82% in 2013 to 80% in 2023.

Yes, you read that correctly. In ten years, fossil fuel use in the energy mix has declined by a measly 2%. But from the point of view of those who would eliminate fossil fuel use it’s worse than that, because:

Demand for energy has increased by 15% over this period and [only] 40% of this growth has been met by clean [sic] energy, i.e. renewables in the power and end-use sectors, nuclear, and low-emissions fuels, including carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). In advanced economies, overall energy demand declined on average by 0.5% per year over the past decade. Oil demand peaked in this grouping in 2005, coal has been in structural decline since 2008 while natural gas, in aggregate, has ceased to grow. Nuclear has fallen around one-half percentage point per year, while renewables have increased by 3% per year since 2013. In emerging market and developing economies – a grouping that includes almost 85% of the world’s population – energy demand increased at around 2.6% per year over the last decade. The underlying drivers are a rise in the population of more than 720 million people, a 50% rise in the size of the economy and a 40% increase in industrial output. Floorspace in buildings has increased by 40 000 square kilometres, enough to cover the entirety of the Netherlands. With this rapid rate of development, clean energy has to work harder to displace oil, gas and coal in emerging market and developing economies than in advanced economies.

One might argue (I certainly would) that the STEPS analysis is hugely over-optimistic, but even on this basis, the IEA worries that we aren’t doing nearly enough. See page 25:

Although the STEPS sees a threefold increase in renewables that brings fossil fuel use down from 80% of total energy demand in 2023 to 58% in 2050, this falls far short of the step change that occurs in the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) and the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE) Scenario, especially the latter.

Page 29 reiterates the (Indian/Asian) elephant in the room:

Asia has become the focal point for global oil and gas trade: it now imports more than twice as much oil as Europe, the next-largest importing region, and it eclipsed Europe as the largest market for imported natural gas in 2022 (Figure 1.5). In the STEPS, these trends continue. China – the world’s largest importer – sees its dependence on oil imports rise from around 75% today to more than 80% by 2050. Similar trends are projected for India, where natural gas dependence rises from 50% today to nearly 75%. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia, which is currently a net exporter of natural gas, becomes a net importer before 2030.

China again looms large on page 32 with regard to another problem associated with the developed world’s increasing reliance on renewable energy:

New energy security hazards are emerging as the world moves towards a more electrified and renewables-rich energy system, highlighting the need for policy makers to continually adjust and assess their approach to energy security. One issue of particular concern for many policy makers today is the concentration in a small number of countries of clean energy supply chains for manufacturing capacity and critical mineral mining and processing. China has a very large proportion of existing manufacturing capacity for key clean energy technologies. This includes 85-95% of global manufacturing capacity for battery cathode and anode materials, more than 80% of global solar PV manufacturing capacity, and more than 75-90% of the global processing capacity for cobalt, graphite and rare earth elements.

And on page 33:

Another concern is the level of critical mineral supplies that are available. For a number of critical minerals, supply growth from the pipeline of confirmed and announced projects is set to be slower than expected growth in demand. The situation is most pressing for copper and lithium, highlighting some new risks to supply security and clean energy transitions. Market signals should lead to the development of new projects, although new mining projects tend to have very long lead times. On the demand side, changes in battery chemistries or enhanced efforts for recycling may succeed in reducing demand.

The optimistic analysis regarding sales of electric vehicles (up to page 38) is well worth a read. It strikes me as whistling in the dark to keep one’s spirits up, but I may be wrong, and they may be correct. If they are correct, of course, then this brings its own problems – see page 39:

The share of electricity in total final consumption rises more rapidly than in the past in all three scenarios and across nearly all regions. This trend is a consequence of increased electrification in households and commercial buildings as well as in transport and industry. Most of this demand growth is from emerging market and developing economies. China dominates, but other countries make a significant contribution, especially after 2030. However, the pace of demand growth – and the uncertainties surrounding it – also pose challenges for ensuring a secure, affordable and sustainable electricity supply.

Page 42 shows a wonderful disregard of real-life trends in favour of their preferred scenario:

Faster uptake of heat pumps is central to efforts to boost energy efficiency and cut fossil fuel use in buildings. Although sales of heat pumps slowed in 2023 in some regions, and saw a major slowdown in Europe in the first half of 2024, their market share in space heating is still set to almost double by 2035 in the STEPS…

We saw more wishful thinking on page 44:

A larger share of variable renewables raises the potential for imbalances between available supply and demand. A good deal of seasonal energy demand is also transferred onto the power system through the increasing use of electric heating and cooling equipment. Electricity storage, stronger grids, demand-side response and dispatchable low-emissions sources of power are essential to meet flexibility requirements in clean energy transitions, and the STEPS sees investment in grids increase by nearly 70% to 2030 to modernise and extend them, and investment in battery storage nearly triples. Load patterns may also change as more end-uses become electric. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity. While the APS sees short-term flexibility requirements in 2050 increase up to seven times in some regions, it also sees half of those requirements met by maximising the scope for demand response, for example by shifting peak load to reflect when owners charge EVs or operate heat pumps. Measures of this kind would also help to keep household electricity bills down.

They clearly went to the same school as Mr Miliband. Investment in renewables (remember, it’s always an investment, never a cost) increases by 70% to 2030, and electricity bills will be kept down, despite the fact that as the percentage of renewables in the mix has increased, so has the cost of energy.

On page 45 we are told that “[s]olar PV and wind are now the cheapest electricity sources in most markets” but I can’t see any supporting evidence to back up the claim. If it were true, one might expect these forms of electricity production to be easily outstripping fossil fuel use, but it isn’t, as the IEA sadly has to concede (also page 45):

...growth in clean power generation has not kept pace with global electricity demand. Global output from low-emissions sources of electricity, including all renewable energy technologies, nuclear, fossil fuels with carbon capture, hydrogen and ammonia, increased by 4 800 TWh from 2010 to 2023, but global electricity generation increased by nearly 8 400 TWh (Figure 1.14). Wind and solar PV together accounted for three-quarters of clean power growth over the period, and hydro, bioenergy, geothermal and nuclear power (in that order) accounted for the final quarter. To fill the gap, global coalfired generation increased by almost 2 000 TWh (+23%) from 2010 to 2023 and gas-fired output increased by over 1 700 TWh (+36%). As a result, electricity sector CO2 emissions increased by 20% over the period, rising from 11.4 gigatonnes (Gt) in 2010 to 13.7 Gt in 2023…

As usual, the problem is starkest in Asia (page 46) and even in China, which the IEA repeatedly lauds for the growth of renewable energy:

In several emerging market and developing economies, low-emissions sources were not able to keep pace with overall electricity demand growth between 2018 and 2023, leading to increased use of coal and natural gas to generate power. China is the global market leader in the deployment of clean power technologies, including solar PV, wind, hydro and nuclear power, but it has also seen coal-fired power increase by over 20% and natural gas by 40% over the last five years. Since its electricity demand is far larger than that of any other country, the speed at which China transitions to clean energy is of huge significance, and it will be a landmark day when clean power growth in China outstrips overall electricity demand. India and Indonesia have increased clean power by 40% and 50% respectively over the past five years, but from a low starting point, and the use of unabated fossil fuels in the power sector has also increased significantly. Given the high level of dependence on coal in both countries, their near-term plans for clean energy transitions and long-term commitments to reach net zero emissions are crucially important…

Surprisingly perhaps (and this is where the Guardian headline becomes relevant) the report suggests (page 50) that:

A large new wave of LNG export capacity is also set to come on line: if all projects that are under construction are completed on time, available liquefaction capacity is expected to rise globally from 580 bcm per year today to 850 bcm per year in 2030. This increase in export capacity is larger than projected LNG demand growth in all three scenarios; the result is an overhang of capacity which is set to depress international gas prices and set the stage for fierce competition between suppliers.

At page 53 we see more evidence that the IEA can do little more than crystal ball gaze, since nobody, least of all them, can accurately predict the future. In effect, they say that supply of natural gas might exceed demand, in which case prices will fall; but then again, if renewables don’t expand as projected, then demand for natural gas will be higher, so the anticipated price falls might not happen. Who knows? Not the IEA, that’s for sure (not me, either):

In the STEPS, natural gas demand peaks before 2030 and declines throughout the 2030s, mainly due to the rapid deployment of renewables, heat pumps and other efficiency measures. But clean energy technologies could be adopted at a slower pace and scale than seen in the STEPS, and alongside other factors, this could lead to natural gas demand continuing to rise throughout the 2030s and beyond…

Page 61 repeats the puzzle created by the claim that solar and wind are cheap. If so, what’s the problem in developing countries? And there clearly is a problem:

Recent increases in clean energy investment come mostly from advanced economies and China, making up 85% of the total, while other emerging market and developing economies, home to two-thirds of the global population, account for just 15% (Figure 1.25). This misalignment is a major concern, given that demand for energy services in developing economies will inevitably increase in the coming years to support rising standards of living, universal access to energy and construction of modern infrastructure. The high cost of capital and lack of affordable long-term financing is a key contributor to these regional imbalances and an impediment to increasing capital flows to emerging market and developing economies in the future.

Turning once more to recent trends (the ones which surely most accurately point the way to imminent trends?), page 70 delivers some stark home truths:

Following an increase of 8 exajoules (EJ) in 2022, global energy demand increased by around 13 EJ in 2023, pushing up global demand by 2%. This reflects a growing requirement for energy in emerging market and developing economies which more than cancelled out a fall in energy demand in advanced economies of around 2%. There was a large increase in both oil and coal use globally, and two-thirds of the total increase in energy demand in 2023 was met by fossil fuels.

Global oil demand increased by 2 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2023 to 99 mb/d…

…Global coal demand increased by just over 100 million tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2023 to around 6 000 Mtce, mainly because of increased use in the power sector in China and India…Demand in 2024 is expected to be slightly higher than in 2023 as strong electricity demand in China and India result in higher coal demand that more than offsets continued cuts in coal use in the European Union…

Page 71:

The energy sector is responsible for around 85% of total global CO2 emissions; energy-related CO2 emissions rose by 1.3% in 2023 to a record high of 37.7 gigatonnes (Gt). Emissions from coal drove most of the increase. Energy-related CO2 emissions were about 1 Gt higher in 2023 than in 2019. The world has clearly not yet turned the corner on emissions.

Page 76 illustrates (as we sceptics have been saying for some considerable time) the danger of creating a situation where China is so dominant:

Clean energy supply chains are also subject to geopolitical tensions. At present, China produces more than 80% of the world’s battery cells and solar photovoltaic (PV) modules, and 65% of wind nacelles (Figure 2.7). It dominates the midstream refining and processing of critical minerals, accounting for 65% of global processing for lithium and over 75% for cobalt and nearly all the graphite anode supply chain. China currently produces two-thirds of the world’s electric vehicles (EVs). Investment in these areas has picked up in the United States, European Union, India and elsewhere, and China’s share in global EV sales slipped from 70% in 2022 to 65% in 2023, but it is still very large. Consumers around the world have benefited from the reductions in technology costs that large-scale supply chain investment has brought. Nonetheless, such a high degree of concentration presents risks.

On page 85, a penny seems to drop:

Some changes roll back commitments to emissions reductions or clean energy deployment. This applies both to sustainability targets and the enabling measures that are designed to reach them. In some cases, these changes happen because ambitions were set at a level that now appears to be unrealistic. In 2019, for example, the administration in Scotland committed itself to a 75% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 from their 1990 level. This target is now set to be dropped. At corporate level, there are many examples of firms adjusting their near-term targets, usually making them less stringent, in response to unfavourable market conditions, doubts surrounding government policy, or a realisation that achieving targets would be more difficult than initially assumed. In other cases, decision makers have argued that too much emphasis was being placed on energy transition measures at the expense of other goals, including those related to energy security and affordability, and changes in response to this sometimes mean longer timelines for introducing new technologies, or reduced incentives and policy support for their deployment.

The sector dealing with costs ends on page 96, and concludes with some real issues for the renewables sector:

…the proportion of costs accounted for by the cost of cathode raw materials in the battery pack price has been rising. Around 30% of the cost of a battery pack now depends on the cost of critical minerals, and battery costs are increasingly susceptible to mineral price volatility. Material substitution can mitigate price volatility to an extent, as it did when lithium iron phosphate battery chemistry displaced nickel-rich battery chemistries during the recent years of high nickel and cobalt prices. However, there is no alternative at present for some of the critical minerals used for particular functions in battery packs, including copper in the current collector in lithium-ion battery anodes and graphite in lithium-ion batteries. Manufacturing costs for wind turbines rose in second-quarter 2023 as a result of an increase in steel and freight costs. Companies in China have so far proven able to produce wind turbines at lower cost than their European counterparts. However, this has not translated into a large increase in exports due in large part to the costs and logistical complexities of moving large wind turbines very long distances. Offshore wind has higher upfront costs than onshore wind and solar PV. In 2023, developers struggled with project profitability due to inflation, high interest rates and supply chain challenges in connection with large turbine manufacturing and installation. Several contracts were cancelled because previously agreed prices became unviable. As ever, governments will need to pay close attention to market and cost dynamics as they design policies and support schemes for emerging technologies.

I mentioned above that the report is more useful when reporting on recent events than when it is speculating about the future. The report pretty much says as much itself when updating its projections, admitting that the 2023 report’s assumptions are being undone. And so, on page 101, we read this:

In the STEPS, the outlook for coal has been revised upwards particularly for the coming decade, principally as a result of updated electricity demand projections, notably from China and India. Total coal demand is 300 million tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) or 6% higher in 2030 than in the WEO-2023. Even with this revision, coal demand declines by an average of 2% each year through to 2050. The outlook for total natural gas demand in the STEPS is also higher in 2024. This is mostly the result of stronger projected electricity demand growth, particularly in China, and an increase in natural gas supply reflecting expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity. By 2035, total natural gas demand is around 175 billion cubic metres (bcm) or 4% higher in this year’s STEPS than in 2023. As in the WEO-2023, however, total natural gas demand flattens by the end of this decade. Higher electricity demand in the STEPS 2024 mainly reflects projected increased light industry activity, notably in China, much of it associated with a rapid rise in clean technology manufacturing. Upward revisions also reflect faster adoption of EVs, increased demand from data centres, and increased electrification of industrial processes in emerging market and developing economies. By 2035, electricity demand is over 2 000 terawatt-hours (TWh) or 6% higher in this edition than in the WEO-2023.

Also:

Global energy intensity reduced by 1% in 2023, a smaller improvement than the 2% reduction seen in 2022. Certain emerging market and developing economies made relatively slow progress, while there were significant energy intensity improvements elsewhere, including in the United States and European Union, largely driven by mild weather, high energy prices and reduced industrial activity

Pages 135-136 deal with fossil fuels, their share of the energy market and trends in developed and developing countries. After all those years of COPs and the seemingly never-ending headlines about the rapid growth of renewable energy, its fans might be surprised to read this (though it won’t surprise sceptics):

Fossil fuels met just under 80% of global energy demand in 2023, a share that has fallen very gradually since 2011, when it stood at 83%. Aggregate fossil fuel demand has continued to accompany broader economic growth, but in some areas this relationship is starting to loosen. This is particularly the case in advanced economies, which have seen their economies grow by 20% over the past ten years while fossil fuel use has contracted by nearly 10%, helped by investment in clean energy technologies, rising shares of services in the economy and efficiency improvements. In emerging market and developing economies, on the other hand, increasing energy needs have continued to push up fossil fuel use. Over the past ten years, their populations have swelled by 720 million people, they have experienced a 50% increase in economic growth and industrial output has risen by 40%. Floor space in buildings has increased by 40 000 square kilometres – enough to cover the entirety of the Netherlands – and fossil fuel consumption increased 25%. Nonetheless, per capita fossil fuel use in emerging market and developing economies remains at less than half the level of advanced economies; if emerging market and developing economies were to match this level, global fossil fuel use would be almost double what it is today.

Page 140 yet again emphasises the dominance of China with regard to energy, fossil fuel and all aspects of the net zero agenda:

The increase of petrochemicals production in China has been a key factor in recent oil market trends, displacing petrochemical output in other regions and offsetting demand reductions in other sectors (Figure 3.32). Oil demand for use as a petrochemical feedstock in China increased by over 1.5 mb/d between 2019 and 2023, which is 20% more than overall global oil demand growth in the same period. Alone the petrochemicals sector in China now uses more oil than the whole of Japan, which is the world’s fifth-largest oil consumer…Oil demand growth in China continues to be driven by increasing petrochemicals production for the next ten years. Even as overall oil demand peaks, its use as a chemical feedstock in China continues to rise, reaching around 5 mb/d by 2035. Domestic refineries cannot entirely satisfy this growth, and so naphtha and LPG imports double to almost 2.3 mb/d over the same period.

Interestingly (page 141) (please note, Messrs Kerry, Biden, Miliband et al):

The United States has dominated recent global oil supply growth, accounting for over half of the increase in production since 2010…

The Americas certainly play an increasing role in this area:

Brazil, Argentina and Guyana add more than 2.5 mb/d to supply by 2035, expanding current fields and capitalising on recent discoveries…

As luck would have it, the website Oilprice,com has just published an article headed “Billion-Barrel Oil Discoveries Drive South American Energy Cooperation” reporting on the plans of Guyana and Suriname to “jointly develop offshore natural gas resources located near their shared border…This partnership comes as both countries experience significant growth in their oil industries, with ExxonMobil leading production in Guyana and TotalEnergies investing in Suriname.”

But back to the IEA Report. Page 143 reiterates (in my words, not the IEA’s) that we can hold annual Conferences of the Parties until the cows come home, but the ongoing demand for fossil fuels in Asia makes a nonsense of the process:

The Middle East remains the largest crude oil exporter in all scenarios, and the share of its exports flowing to emerging market and developing economies in Asia risesfrom 25% of total seaborne crude trade today to 40% by 2050 in the STEPS. As a result, the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia becomes the world’s largest chokepoint for oil and gas trade, with a higher volume of oil passing through it than the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint in the Persian Gulf. China remains the world’s largest oil importer through to 2050 in the STEPS, and India and Southeast Asia see imports increase by around 35% by that date. By 2050, crude oil import dependency in Asia rises from about 80% today to 90% in all scenarios….

…Global natural gas demand increased by 0.5% in 2023, with a 40 bcm contraction in advanced economies, led by Europe, offset by 60 bcm of growth in emerging market and developing economies, led by China and the Middle East. A wave of new supply is also on the horizon: 270 bcm of new LNG export terminals are under construction, and will add another 50% to global LNG capacity, alongside an additional 200 bcm of annual production from upstream projects sanctioned since early 2022 that target local markets. Natural gas demand has been revised upward in all scenarios compared with the WEO-2023, reflecting stronger anticipated demand for gas to meet growth in electricity demand in China as well as additional demand in the Middle East, where policies to shift away from oil in electricity generation have been reaffirmed. In the STEPS, the level of demand in 2030 has been revised up by 130 bcm compared to the Outlook in 2023, reaching just over 4 400 bcm before demand peaks. Low-emissions gases – biogas, biomethane and hydrogen – are poised to see strong growth in all scenarios.

And at page 148 we learn that the 2023 estimate is already outdated and too low:

Due to an upward adjustment to projected natural gas demand growth to 2030, LNG demand growth in the STEPS is higher than in the WEO-2023, reaching more than 700 bcm by 2035.

Asia continues to drive demand for coal, too (page 150):

China remains the largest consumer of coal, accounting for over half of global coal demand in 2035 in each scenario, but surging growth in renewables and slowly declining demand in industry lead coal use in China to fall over the next few years. India is the second-largest coal consumer and is the main driver of future demand growth: its coal use increases in power to 2030 and in industry to 2050 in the STEPS, and its energy-related CO2 emissions continue to rise before peaking around 2035. Demand increases steadily in a number of countries in Southeast Asia. Almost everywhere else, however, the STEPS sees coal demand head downwards. Advanced economies have historically consumed more coal per capita than emerging market and developing economies, but this has changed in recent years as they have retired coal plants or run them less frequently, while many emerging market and developing economies have installed new plants and used coal to meet rising energy needs. In 2023, 26 GW of coalfired generation capacity were retired globally, 88% of them in advanced economies, while 65 GW were added, almost all in emerging market and developing economies: China accounted for 47 GW (73%) of these global capacity additions….

…Global coal production reached a new record in 2023, driven by growth in China, India and Indonesia. Over 30 new mines opened, 25 in China and four in India (Global Energy Monitor, 2024). China accounted for around 55% of global coal supply. India nearly overtook Indonesia as the second-largest coal producer following two years of record increases in production, and it plans to double coal output by 2030. Despite raising production, China continued to increase coal imports in 2023, while Indonesia and Mongolia raised exports…

And there, dear reader, I will end, albeit only three-eighths of the way through the report. This piece is already long enough, but the above should provide enough evidence that (despite the IEA’s attempts to play up the progress of renewable energy and to emphasise efficiency gains and other grounds to hope that reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases are imminent) the demand for energy continues to grow relentlessly, the IEA’s predictions continue to be falsified by reality, and that the proportion of the energy mix attributable to renewable energy is growing painfully slowly. Indeed, with COP29 just around the corner, fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions are both continuing to grow, and there is little if any evidence that the COP process is making any impact at all in this regard.

It will be interesting in due course to see if the IEA’s 2025 Report will similarly have to row back on the predictions it has made in 2024.