“Renewables overtake fossil fuels to provide 30% of EU electricity – Report finds 13 member states generated more energy from wind and solar power than coal and gas for first time in 2024” gushed the Guardian earlier today. The article is in turn based on a report prepared by Ember, with the title “Wind and solar overtake EU fossil fuels in the first half of 2024”. It sounds great, doesn’t it? Net Zero Nirvana is almost within reach. Or perhaps it isn’t. One has to remember that Ember is a campaigning organisation and its work should always be read with that very important caveat in mind.

Thus it is that the claims in the report – while technically true – aren’t remotely as dramatic or impressive as they appear at first sight. Certainly, the UK’s new Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero might be well-advised not to be advised by people such as these.

The report very excitedly hails the growth of wind and solar in EU electricity generation, at the same time as noting the decline of fossil fuel use to generate electricity, but it comes with a huge caveat:

However, sustaining the EU’s electricity transition at this pace will require dedicated policy focus to ease barriers to wind and solar integration. Adequate support on grid connections and other enablers of swift development will be needed to ensure that economic, security and climate benefits are delivered across Europe.

Two short sentences containing so many problems. “Dedicated policy focus” isn’t explained, nor is “barriers to wind and solar integration”. Equally “[a]dequate support on grid connections and other enablers” is a phrase let hanging in the air, but we can all guess what is meant – money, and lots of it. The barriers to integration are probably the problems associated with connecting to the grid from many disparate and remote locations, with the associated expensive (and unsightly) paraphernalia necessary to enable this – pylons, battery back-up, and so on. Getting to 30% of electricity production from renewables is the easy part. Going beyond it is where the difficulties begin. The low-hanging fruit has all been picked.

We also learn that electricity generated by hydro rebounded to a very impressive 21% of the total. Sadly, this is not something available to policy-makers in the UK, which doesn’t have the same natural advantages as those parts of the EU which are heavily reliant on this form of power generation. Another significant point worth noting is that the strong growth in hydro wasn’t due to increased capacity, rather it was down to better performance following a wet start to the year compared to the drought of the previous two years. Had hydro not recovered so strongly, I suspect that the decline in fossil fuel use might not have been so marked, indeed might not have occurred at all. To rely heavily on hydro when we are constantly being told that extreme weather – to include droughts as well as floods – doesn’t seem like the best means of achieving energy security. A couple of dry years, and those gas and coal power stations will need to ramp up again.

Similarly, nuclear generation increased by 3.1% in the period, as French nuclear generation coming back online following maintenance and outages exceeded the decline in nuclear generation in Germany. Again, that’s a proportion of generation that might otherwise have been supplied by fossil fuels, for want of an alternative.

The weather was an important element in these results in more ways than one. While rains replenished hydro generation after two years of drought, a mild winter also galloped to the rescue:

Demand likely would have risen further if not for a warmer-than-average winter in many Member States, which lowered electricity demand for heating. Without the impact of mild winter weather, demand would have increased by an estimated 2.1%…

Relying on mild winters might be a better bet – if the climate predictions are to be believed – than relying on wet weather, but there is no certainty when it comes to weather. Contingency plans should always be in place.

In addition to rain for hydro and mild temperatures to depress demand for winter heating, we also learn that it was helpfully windy, which facilitated greater electricity generation from wind turbines than might otherwise have been the case. Welcome though that was, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the second half of 2021 saw a Europe-wide wind drought, with wind speeds falling 15% below average over a prolonged period. The result in 2021 was that the proportion of electricity generated by wind turbines was significantly lower than expected. While the first half of 2024 saw beneficial wind conditions, this can’t be relied on and the very unreliability and variability of this source of electricity is problematic – and becomes increasingly problematic as the proportion of electricity generated by wind increases.

These factors are well illustrated by a couple of quotes from the report:

…higher wind speeds across the EU in the first half of 2024 helped boost output. If wind speeds in the first half of 2024 had been the same as in the previous year, wind output would have grown by 5.6% (+13 TWh) instead of the 9.5% (+21 TWh) observed.

The uptick in hydro power was primarily weather-dependent, after several years of significant variation linked to conditions. After years impacted by droughts, Europe experienced higher-than-average rainfall in the first half of 2024. As a result, hydro generation rebounded by 21% (+33 TWh) to reach the highest output since 2018. Some Member States saw particularly large upticks in hydro output: Italy increased by 56% (+8.5 TWh), France by 35% (+9.3 TWh), Spain by 54% (+6.9 TWh) and Portugal by 69% (+3.5 TWh). Overall, hydro generation was 15% higher in the EU than the average generation in January-June over the last 5 years.

Given that the admittedly impressive first six months of the year for renewable electricity generation in Europe was the result of favourable weather (wind and rain), which depressed demand (a mild winter) and returning nuclear generation, I am not convinced that this optimistic claim is entirely justified (especially as getting to 30% of the mix is the easy and least problematic part):

Wind and solar have demonstrated that they can grow quickly enough to meet demand increases and push fossil fuels out of the mix. EU policies aimed at accelerating the energy transition in the wake of the gas price crisis have resulted in record capacity additions for wind and solar, laying the groundwork for a sustained shift away from fossil fuels.

Returning to the point with which we began, we find that continuing to increase renewables growth in the EU is far from problem-free:

As power prices return to pre-crisis levels, Europe cannot rely on the market alone to drive the necessary acceleration of renewables deployment. Well-designed and implemented incentive schemes will remain important to sustaining momentum, as demonstrated by the impressive solar expansion continuing in Germany in 2024. Non-market barriers, such as grid capacity constraints, must also be overcome. This is evident in the Netherlands, where the network has struggled to keep pace with the country’s solar boom.

Also, it shouldn’t be forgotten that most solar panels are obtained from China and that EU solar panel manufacturers have been struggling despite the growth in demand for their products within the EU. Ironically, one of the reasons why manufacturers struggle in the EU (and in the UK, for that matter) is because electricity is so much more expensive than in countries such as China which rely much more heavily on fossil fuels.

In conclusion, I have to concede that renewables have enjoyed a good six months in the EU. The optimism expressed in the Ember report and in the Guardian article based on it may well not be justified. The situation is much more complicated than optimists like to believe. The UK government should base its energy policy on practicality, not on reports prepared by lobbyists.