A few weeks ago the BBC got very excited about the contents of a six-monthly report from Ember. The consequent BBC headline (“Renewables overtake coal as world’s biggest source of electricity”) to an article actually masked what was in many ways a downbeat report, with an acknowledgement that coal was still the world’s largest individual source of energy generation in 2024; that China is still adding to its fleet of coal-fired power stations; and that the EU and USA relied more than before on fossil fuels for energy generation. It also contained a sober reality check for Mr Miliband:

Wind belt countries like the UK face tougher obstacles, however. Wind turbine costs have not come down by anything like as much as solar panels – down just a third or so in the last decade. Higher interest rates have also added to borrowing costs and raised the overall price of installing wind farms significantly in the last few years.

Balancing supply is harder too: winter wind lulls can last for weeks, requiring backup power sources that batteries alone can’t provide – making the system more expensive to build and run.

But what of the report from Ember that led to the BBC’s website article? It can be found here. The first thing to note is that for the first time it was a half-yearly report, previous ones being produced on an annual basis. I discussed a couple of recent ones here and here. Why the release of a six-monthly report for what (I believe) is the first time? Was it timed for maximum impact before COP30? Certainly it seems to be keen to send delegates to Brazil with an upbeat message, as per the study’s sub-heading: “Solar and wind outpaced demand growth in the first half of 2025, as renewables overtook coal’s share in the global electricity mix.” It follows that up with some very encouraging (for climate worriers) key highlights. Covering the first six months of 2025, and making a comparison with the first six months of 2024, it tells us that Solar and wind growth exceeded global demand growth in the first half of 2025 (by 9%); solar generation growth alone met 83% of the global rise in demand in the first half of 2025; and coal generation fell by 0.6% in the first half of 2025. Behind those headline statistics, however, one can find the first faint suggestion that all is not perhaps as rosy as the headlines suggest. Hydro fell significantly over the period; bioenergy dipped slightly; and overall fossil fuel generation fell by only 0.3%. Renewables still account for only 34.3% of global electricity production and coal still accounts for 33.1% (of demand, which rose by 2.6%).

The 2.6% increase in demand for electricity was less than half the 5.3% increase in the same period last year. This was thanks to several factors, including slower growth in China and India and (rather ironically) “to fewer heatwaves in May and June in India.” We are told that growth in demand in India would have been nearer 3% (rather than the actual 1.3%) had 2025’s heatwaves been comparable to those of 2024. Despite slower growth in China, it still accounted for 54% of the global increase in demand for electricity (the US accounted for 21%, India for 3.3% and the EU for 2.4%).

Despite a dizzying growth in solar power (31%), it still supplies only 8.8% of global electricity. In fairness, that’s up from just 3.8% in 2021. As usual, China leads the way, accounting for 55% of the increase in solar over the period, with the US accounting for 14%, the EU for 12% and India 6%. Curiously, though, solar generation declined in Vietnam, and in Japan (due to record levels of curtailment – for both solar and wind). The study links to Japan Energy Hub which tells us:

Longer term, curtailment is likely to increase as renewable capacity grows and nuclear power plant restarts proceed.

The Ember study doesn’t discuss the issue of curtailment any further, but I wonder if it’s an issue that will begin to affect other economies, as renewables play a more important role on grids that were not designed to cope with dispersed and intermittent sources of electricity supply?

Interestingly, also, a sunny start to the year across much of Europe helped to drive increased output from solar sources there, though at a global level, increased capacity was the main driver of increased solar energy. By contrast, declining wind speeds in Europe (and in the US over part of the period) hampered wind energy. Globally it increased by 7.7%, a reduction from the previous year’s growth rate of 9.1%. Wind now accounts for 9.2% of global electricity generation (up from 8.8% in the first half of 2024).

Next comes the celebration of renewables (34.3%) overtaking coal (33.1%) for the first time with regard to electricity generation. However, gas is still at 23%, and other fossil fuel use for electricity generation increased in the year, so overall fossil fuel’s share of electricity generation fell by just 0.3%. Coal use and emissions fell in both China and India as solar and wind took up the slack, but in Europe use of both gas and (to a lesser extent) coal increased, while hydro, bioenergy and wind all produced less electricity than in the same period a year earlier. In the USA coal use increased, as a shift from gas took place and growth in renewables failed to match growth in electricity demand.

Hydro generation has been declining steadily, as a proportion of electricity generation: 16.3% in the first half of 2020; 14.6% in 2024; 13.9% in 2025. Falls were noticeable in the EU, China, Russia, Turkey and Brazil, this being blamed by Ember on droughts. However, it increased in Canada, India, Vietnam, Colombia, USA and Norway. Ember doesn’t speculate on whether this is a good or a bad thing, but it might not be all that environmentally or socially friendly, as a recent Mongabay article demonstrates.

Increased nuclear generation matched increased demand globally, enabling it to maintain its 9.1% share of electricity generation.

As for greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation, it’s a mixed picture. Overall emissions from this sector fell by 0.2% (but due to increased demand, would have increased by 3.9% without increased generation from renewables). Emissions fell in China (by 1.6%) and India (by 3.6%) but increased by 4.8% in the EU and in the US by 4.3%. What goes on in those four major geographical locations is of huge importance, accounting for 63% of electricity demand and 64% of emissions in the first half of 2025. Ember analyses each in turn. Regarding China, after reviewing significant increases in renewables (which now – solar and wind – account for 23.5% of China’s electricity generation), it concludes:

Looking at the past 12 months, fossil generation shows signs of plateauing. However, it remains unclear when fossil fuels will definitely peak in China, partly because weather can play a significant role in year-to-year variations in demand and generation.

It’s perhaps worth noting that coal still generated 56% of China’s electricity in the first half of 2025. Ember doesn’t give us the comparison between China’s share of global electricity demand and its share of associated greenhouse gas emissions, as it does for other economies. The cynic in me wonders if that’s because despite the great story it tells about the growth in Chinese renewables, the figures would look rather unimpressive if presented in that way. I strongly suspect it would reveal a share of CO2 emissions that considerably exceeds its share of global electricity demand. Thus, I find it hard to believe that it’s an accidental oversight.

The US, for example, is said to be responsible for 15% of global electricity demand, but for only 12% of global power sector CO2 emissions in the first half of 2025. But solar and wind met only 65% of increased demand, so emissions grew, especially thanks to the shift from gas to coal. Solar now meets 8.7% of demand (up from 6.9%), but wind is down from 11.7% to 11.5%. Power sector emissions increased by 4.3%, largely because coal generation increased by 17%, taking its share of generation from 14.4% to 16.2%.

India accounted for 6.2% of global electricity demand and 9.1% of associated CO2 emissions in the first half of 2025. India’s electricity demand growth was moderate – as mentioned above, it is suggested that this is because of less extreme heat in the first half of the year. Somebody should tell the BBC. Ember says demand growth in the second half of the year is likely to drive higher coal generation. Massive growth in solar (from 7.4% to 9.2% of the mix) and wind (from 4% to 5.1% of the mix) was impressive and exceeded the increase in demand. Coal and gas generation both declined as did associated emissions, but Ember is rather coy about letting us know what proportion of generation was provided by coal and gas. In fact, more than coy – they don’t tell us. Again, I can’t help feeling that this is the result of a deliberate decision rather than an accidental oversight.

Turning to the EU, it generated 8.8% of global electricity and only 4.4% of associated emissions. Solar grew more than demand, but poor conditions for wind and hydro caused their output to fall, so gas use and associated emissions both increased. EU demand growth remains constrained, and while Ember blames covid for ealier low demand, it also acknowledges, without any apparent sense of irony, that high electricity prices may be playing a part.

Solar’s share of the EU mix was up from 12% to 14%, but wind generation fell by 8.5%, taking its share of the mix down from 19% to 17%. Poor wind conditions between January and April were held to blame. Who’d have thought that relying on a weather-dependent energy source might be problematic? Especially at a time when we’re constantly told that climate change is making the weather more extreme and erratic. Hydro fell by 17%, taking its share of the mix from 15% to 12%. Bioenergy also dropped.

Gas-fired generation increased by 14%, compared to a 14% fall in the same six months period in the previous year, so its share of the mix increased from 14% to 16%. Coal, which fell by 24% in the previous year, increased by 1.1%, so it maintained its 9.7% share.

As a result, the EU’s power sector emissions increased by 13 MtCO2 (+4.8%) in the first half of 2025.

The report ends with a breathless rush of optimism, based on what it says are falling prices for both solar and wind – but surely, while that statement might be true of the former, it isn’t true of the latter. Certainly not in the UK, anyway. And, as so often, it concludes with a plea for a transfer of funds from developed to developing countries to enable the “transition” to take place:

However, some emerging economies still face higher costs of capital and other capacity constraints. Support from mature economies, particularly those with historic emissions, is crucial to overcoming these barriers and keeping the pathway to net-zero within reach.

By the way, when Ember talks about renewables, it includes bioenergy within that sector. Thus it is evident that the headline claim about renewables producing more electricity globally than is generated by coal was achieved only by something of a sleight of hand.

Meanwhile, speaking of Ember, another article appeared at the BBC late last month, with the heading: “Source of Miliband’s energy bill pledge casts doubt on savings”. That pledge, we are told, was based on yet another report by Ember. There’s just one problem:

…the author of the report, economist Pawel Czyzak, has told the BBC the analysis needs to be updated to take into account changes to the cost of offshore wind and other factors.

It appears, however, that while Mr Miliband seems to have embraced the original report, he isn’t so keen on its author’s change of tune:

A spokesperson for Miliband’s department said the UK government remained “determined to bring down bills, for good, and stand by our commitments”.

Just like Thatcher forty five years ago, it seems Mr Miliband’s not for turning.

Back in the real world, we are told (by the Guardian!): “Global use of coal hit record high in 2024 – Bleak report finds greenhouse gas emissions are still rising despite ‘exponential’ growth of renewables”.

Of course, the Ember report confines its focus to the sources of generation of electricity across the globe. Interesting though this may be, the problem with it is that (according to the International Energy Agency) as of 2023 electricity represented only 21% of global energy consumption. That’s a proportion that isn’t increasing rapidly. For what it’s worth, AI tells me that the proportion of electricity involved in global energy production right now is still just “approximately 21% to 22%”. While the Ember report was thus concerned about developments only with regard to this 21% or 22%, the report referred to by the Guardian is concerned with the proportion of all fuels supplying total global energy demand. Published by Systems Change Lab and, as it tells us, funded by Bezos Earth Fund, Climate Analytics, Climateworks Foundation, Race to Zero, Race to Resilience and World Resources Institute, it’s a much bigger report (running to 137 pages) than Ember’s six-monthly review, and it explicitly acknowledges that it was timed to precede COP30. More importantly, perhaps, because its focus isn’t confined to electricity, it’s significantly more downbeat than the Ember report.

At 137 pages, it’s far too long to look at in depth, so what follows is a brief summary, that can usefully be contrasted to the figures contained in the Ember report. Needless to say it’s a catalogue of woe. A flavour of much of what follows can be gathered from the introduction:

Halfway through the middle of what the climate community has dubbed the “decisive decade,” urgency is fading, vested interests in maintaining the status quo are playing defense as strongly as ever, and complacency is on the rise (Mishra 2024; García Santamaría et al. 2024; Ekberg et al. 2022). This past year saw a troubling backsliding of action, precisely when the world needed it most. The international solidarity that led to the Paris Agreement a decade ago has weakened, with countries facing roadblocks at the negotiating table that are stifling progress when it’s more important than ever. In many major economies, primarily those with large oil and gas reserves, entrenched fossil fuel interests continue to exert powerful political influence, stymieing climate ambition and action…

“Climate community” indeed! Of course, we sceptics have been pointing out for very many years that there is a community of vested climate interests lobbying extensively for action, but it’s good to have it confirmed by a member of that community. I’ll leave aside the climate catastrophising contained in the report, and concentrate on things like this:

An enormous acceleration in effort is needed across every sector. By 2030, for example, electricity generated from unabated gas needs to be phased out seven times faster, declines in deforestation need to accelerate ninefold, and growth in total climate finance needs to increase four times faster.

A few “key” findings:

None of the 45 indicators assessed are on track to reach their 1.5°C-aligned targets for 2030.

For 5 of these indicators, recent rates of change are heading in the wrong direction entirely.

Progress made in decarbonizing steel has largely stagnated, such that CO2 emissions per tonne of crude steel produced increased over the last five years.

The share of trips taken by passenger cars, many of which still rely on the internal combustion engine, continue to rise, now accounting for about half of all distances travelled.

Ironically, citing as its authority for the statement the Ember report I considered above, this report tells us that “[e]qually concerning are sluggish efforts to phase out electricity generated from coal, the largest source of GHG emissions in the power sector.”

The scale-up of total climate finance, particularly from public sources, also remains well off track.

Whilst not admitting it, the following paragraph effectively agrees with Robin Guenier’s argument that the Paris Agreement has comprehensively failed and can’t be resurrected:

In modeled pathways that limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels with no or limited overshoot, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions peak before 2025 at the latest and then fall by a median of 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035, relative to 2019.9 In these pathways, carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions reach net zero by around mid-century. Achieving such deep reductions, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) finds, will require rapid transformations across power, buildings, industry, transport, forests and land, and food and agriculture—sectors that collectively accounted for 86 percent of GHG emissions in 2023 — as well as the immediate scale-up of climate finance and technological carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

This report has been written ostensibly to tell policy-makers at COP30 what they need to achieve. Any realists at COP30 who read it ought to draw the conclusion that they should all give up and go home. The “rapid transformations” that the report calls for, and which it acknowledges aren’t yet happening, simply aren’t going to happen. As 2030 (one of the “critical” dates) looms ever closer, and as even 2050 doesn’t seem so very far in the future, it ought to be apparent to anyone other than the “climate community” that the show’s over.

Speaking of the climate community, the closing words of the conclusion read like a sermon to the faithful:

Most indicators assessed in this report are moving in the right direction, albeit far too slowly. To turn these sparks of hope into a firestorm of change, we must not retreat. Instead, now is the moment to rise with resolve and turn scattered gains into systemic change that delivers for everyone.

I’m waiting and watching. Despite the invaluable presence of the Mayor of West Yorkshire my money’s on COP30 being the usual story of failure. They really should face reality and call it a day.