Aficionados of this website will have learnt a long time ago that I have a pronounced distaste for psychologists who try to explain climate change ‘denial’ by using taxonomies of cognitive bias. Personally, I’d throw all such research into a deep pit, were it not for the fact that it would have to be bottomless in order for it not to overflow. It just never occurs to these people that the reason why we haven’t all swallowed the authorised narrative in all its glory is because we think we can see technical flaws in it. On the contrary, they don’t have to even think about such a possibility because they already have their answer: To disagree with a scientific consensus is irrational, and so those who do so must be cognitively challenged in a way that no one else is. For example, in his piece, ‘Roots of Climate Change Denial’, climate activist David Selby, approvingly observes:

In Don’t Even Think About It, George Marshall devotes very little space to the science of climate change. What science there is appears in a four-page add-on chapter at the very end of his 260-page book. His motive here is to underscore that the climate change challenge is not primarily techno-scientific but rather psychological.

And when Selby refers to a psychological challenge, what he means is that cognitive bias is the root cause of ‘denial’. Providing frameworks for overcoming such bias is what the psychology profession is here to do.

Quite apart from the arrogant presumption on show here, what I find particularly troublesome is the failure to recognise the universality of cognitive bias and how it affects everyone’s deliberations, notwithstanding the extent to which an individual’s conclusions do or do not ultimately align with the socially accepted view. They are heuristics that have evolutionary benefit and if you want to understand how they operate you need to appreciate what they are actually good for and the circumstances in which the heuristic can nevertheless mislead. Simply focusing upon one group of people who you deem to be incorrect and observing how a bias manifests itself in their particular case does not give you the cause of the bias. For the full picture, one also has to consider how the same bias can play a role in arriving at an alternative view, and thereby recognise that the bias itself does not necessarily explain differences of opinion. It is because this basic principle is so rarely acknowledged that the vast bulk of the material written on this subject is selective at best and, at worst, opinionated nonsense. It is this failure that has resulted in a preoccupation with the psychology of the contrarian and a complete neglect of the psychology behind a blind trust in authority.

A practical example

As a case in point, consider the paper, ‘A framework to address cognitive biases of climate change’, written by Jiaying Zhao and Yu Luo of the University of British Columbia, in which the following bold claim is made:

We propose a framework that outlines several predominant cognitive biases of climate change, identifies potential causes, and proposes debiasing tools, with the ultimate goal of depolarizing climate beliefs and promoting actions to mitigate climate change.

The opening sentence of the paper reads, ‘Climate change is an urgent crisis facing humanity’. It is clear therefore that the authors believe the ‘techno-scientific’ issue to have already been dealt with and all that remains is the challenge of identifying and combating the cognitive biases that cause people to disagree with such a verdict. Accordingly, the paper comprises a list of cognitive biases, their presupposed causes and how they may be overcome in order to put the climate change sceptic back on the right track. I’d like to quickly go through that list with you, pointing out in each case how the cause of bias is misdiagnosed and what would therefore need to be added in order to arrive at a fair and balanced assessment.

Attentional Bias

What the authors say it is:

Allowing political orientation or prior beliefs about climate change to influence what information is attended to.

What the authors say causes it:

To be fair, the authors put this down to motivated reasoning that they admit can exist on both sides of the political divide (in this case Republicans and Democrats). However, according to them, it is only the Republicans who are actually misled by this bias, because it causes them to fail to appreciate that climate change is an urgent crisis facing humanity. To overcome this, the authors propose that one should try to invoke the Republicans’ own values when seeking to convince them of the need to tackle climate change.

The true cause:

Attentional bias is the tendency to prioritize the processing of certain types of stimuli over others. This has the evolutionary advantage of prioritising those stimuli that are suggestive of threats and opportunities. Everyone is subject to this bias. You wouldn’t last long if you were not. The only difference is that we are all sensitised according to our mental model of how the world threatens us and where the opportunities it offers us lie.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

The motivated reasoning runs far deeper than political orientation and prior beliefs about climate change. It is an irresistible bias that is driven by our survival instinct. There is no reason to presuppose that Democrats have a better mental model with which to prioritise the processing of stimuli. Rather than supposing this to be the case and seeking to redress the sceptical mind-set, one should instead return to the ‘techno-scientific’ issues but with a much wider scope of risk analysis and a better appreciation of how perspective and values influence risk evaluation.

Perceptual Bias

What the authors say it is:

Inaccurate perceptions of ingroup norms and outgroup norms leading to an exaggerated perception of the level of support for a given view or policy.

What the authors say causes it:

An inability to adapt to a new environment or update prior beliefs given new information. The authors propose that this may be overcome by reconstructing accurate representations of social norms.

The true cause:

Perceptual bias occurs when we subconsciously draw conclusions based on what we expect to see or experience. It has evolutionary advantage since more often than not our expectations are based upon a reliable model of how the world fundamentally works. However, this is not always the case and our perceptions can therefore be misleading.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

We all carry prior beliefs that anchor us and modify the manner in which we perceive new information. Both nature and nurture play a role in deciding the form these preconceptions take, but there is no reason to assume that this is particularly true of climate change sceptics. Representations of social norms are not important to climate sceptics apart from when they argue that it is often a mistake to represent a social norm as having epistemic value.

Recall Bias

What the authors say it is:

Falsely recalling climate change to be less serious, which is associated with higher skepticism of climate change.

What the authors say causes it:

Lack of awareness of the urgency and severity of climate change. The authors propose that such ignorance can be tackled by acquiring attitudes, norms, and facts by observing the behavior of others or watching videos.

The true cause:

Recall bias is a systematic error that occurs when individuals do not remember previous events or experiences accurately or omit details. There are many reasons why such ‘false memories’ may be created. However, the authors’ conception of recall bias has nothing to do with true recall bias. They are instead alluding to a disputed assessment regarding the significance of past events.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

The psychological affect that severe weather can have on the individual may indeed be influenced by their views on climate change, but that potential exists irrespective of what those beliefs may be. Furthermore, false recall (or more to the point, false assessment) can be just as readily inculcated by hyping the severity of recent weather as it can be by playing it down.

‘Techno-scientific’ concerns such as the integrity of climate data collection, collation and homogenisation, and of severe weather event attribution are relevant if the science is to be a reliable yardstick against which to compare personal recall. Severe weather event attribution is particularly germane here since the IPCC has openly advocated that it should be used to encourage a higher perception of the urgency and severity of climate change. It is not about changing memories so much as changing attitudes, such as viewing normal summer weather as a new threat worthy of health alerts.

Confirmation Bias

What the authors say it is:

Seeking information that confirms prior beliefs or discounting information that contradicts prior beliefs.

What the authors say causes it:

Lack of knowledge about the causes or consequences of climate change, or what actions to take.

The true cause:

The authors correctly describe what confirmation bias is but completely miss the point by suggesting it is born of ignorance. Confirmation bias provides an important evolutionary advantage since it encourages us all to be cognitive misers. With limited cognitive capacity, we should concentrate our efforts on what we understand to be effective and rewarding. This may lead to satisficing rather than optimising but this is often the best strategy for survival.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

A reliance on confirmation bias is part of the human condition. Unfortunately, however, it is also a bias that commonly leads individuals to jump to the wrong conclusions and thereafter be very slow to recognise their error. However, this propensity is not limited to those who happen to hold views that lie outside the social norm. Those who believe that ‘climate change is an urgent crisis facing humanity’ are just as likely to indulge in confirmation bias to support that view. This is exemplified perfectly by the authors of this study when they assume cognitive bias is the rational explanation for climate scepticism and then mischaracterise cognitive biases to further their ‘explanation’.

Present Bias

What the authors say it is:

Priority given to people and objectives that are closer in terms of time and space than more distant ones.

What the authors say causes it:

Incorrect assumptions and inaccurate understandings of the drivers of climate change. To overcome such bias the authors suggest that one should generate arguments for forward-looking options and consider the legacy for future generations.

The true cause:

As always, one has to understand that the bias must have an evolutionary advantage, otherwise it would not have become an inherent human trait. In the case of present bias the underlying cause is an ambiguity aversion in which opportunities and risks that are better known or more easily formulated are preferred to those that require speculation. Normally this is a sensible approach; however, there are circumstances in which this strategy may turn out to be flawed, leading to a failure to delay gratification or to excessively downplay future risk. The authors are assuming that climate change is one of those situations, i.e. although it is a future risk that is hard for the individual to apprehend, it is nevertheless inappropriate to favour the present day rewards gained by failing to address this future risk.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

It is wrong to portray present bias as the inappropriate discounting of future risk since it can just as easily apply to legitimate discounting. Whether or not it is appropriate on a given occasion is a highly ‘techno-scientific’ question that requires a full understanding of uncertainties and impacts associated with both the risk and its proposed reduction. When one looks at what the current UK Government proposes to do to ‘tackle climate change’, it actually becomes quite easy to argue for a greater degree of present bias.

Status Quo Bias

What the authors say it is:

An unwillingness to change the status quo because any change involves effort and uncertainty.

What the authors say causes it:

A false sense of contentment due to a lack of knowledge regarding the seriousness of climate change. To prevent individuals from making incorrect decisions based upon such ignorance, the authors suggest making ‘climate-friendly’ options the default.

The true cause:

Status quo bias assists us all by discouraging us from potentially unnecessary expenditure and the taking of unnecessary risk. Nevertheless, research has shown that the preference for a status quo can often be irrationally held, suggesting that that are other factors at play such as loss aversion and regret bias.  

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

Sometimes, of course, doing nothing is not the best course of action, but the fact that status quo bias has become a human instinct suggests that more often than not it is. As with present bias, the question as to whether status quo bias is beneficial or harmful in any given instance can only be settled by a ‘techno-scientific’ argument. Even so, there is no reason to focus purely upon the relevance of status quo bias to the sceptical position. It is equally of relevance to consider the effort and uncertainty that some individuals are prepared to advocate in order to retain a climatic status quo.

Pseudo-inefficacy

What the authors say it is:

A false sense of inefficacy of individual actions not making an appreciable contribution to solving a large overall problem.

What the authors say causes it:

Misperceptions such as the underestimation of carbon footprints associated with individual actions. The authors claim that this can be overcome by highlighting human contributions to climate change as opposed to natural causes.

The true cause:

Pseudo-inefficacy is a form of ‘psychic numbing’ in the face of a seemingly overwhelming challenge. It is not due to a misperception of the scale of the problem or that of available mitigations. Rather, it is a tendency to undervalue a given mitigation when the resulting risk remains large. For example, reducing the potential financial impact of a risk by £100 will be valued much greater if the initial potential impact were £200 than if it were £2,000,000. As such, pseudo-inefficacy bias has its basis in prospect theory.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

Rather than pushing the narrative that every little helps, the authors should be emphasising the futility of a country achieving net zero in order to reduce global emissions by less than 2 per cent, whilst far larger contributors to the problem are increasing their emissions by a much larger amount. As well as pseudo-inefficacy there is such a thing as pseudo-efficacy.

Single-action Bias

What the authors say it is:

Perceiving a reduced risk of climate change after taking one climate action.

What the authors say causes it:

The temporary alleviation of negative affect after taking one climate action. The authors claim that this bias can be overcome by reinforcing the connection between climate actions and a person’s identity or values by reflecting on how the behavior is related to their values, identity, or views on how people in society should behave.

The true cause:

It is not clear from the literature that this bias even exists. It is a term coined by a Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University when observing that farmers tend to do only one thing to address climate change. The presupposition is that they are engaging in tokenism, i.e. they simply wish to be seen to have at least done something.

What the authors should have also said to achieve balance:

One cannot argue that there is such a thing as pseudo-inefficacy (‘a false sense of inefficacy of individual actions not making an appreciable contribution‘) and then complain about a supposed single-action bias. If individuals only wish to take one action, then they should be encouraged to do so because ‘every little helps’.

Conclusions

One has to question the motivation for writing papers such as this. It’s not as if it is original in any shape or form and so no one is going to give its authors credit for providing the breakthrough that finally unlocks the door to tackling climate change. What it does do, however, is lay on top of all of its predecessors, thereby helping to compost the genre. As such it is just another example of how a whole profession seems to have prostituted itself to the will of scientific consensus, not for one moment questioning the ‘techno-scientific’ details of which its members are only vaguely aware. Instead, they are finding a way to make what they think they understand about human nature fit their preconceptions of the climate sceptic. Furthermore, they think this can safely be achieved without actually engaging with them. In fact, avoiding such contact is deemed essential for a successful diagnosis. What follows is high-handed condescension.

All I can say is, whatever happened to peer review?