Abstract

Why are psychologists seemingly obsessed with conspiracy theorists, and how can an answer to that question be supplied without sounding like one? The answer psychologists always give to the first question is that conspiracist ideation is on the rise and it is very harmful to society. But is it really? Conspiracy theories have been around as long as conspiracy. There may very well be a rising mood of distrust within society, but could that not just be down to a growing awareness of the extent to which governments and others in positions of power conspire? Do we really expect revelations such as the NHS blood scandal to have no effect on the zeitgeist? And just how harmful is it anyway to have a distrustful society? Climate scepticism is supposed to be hindering the implementation of Net Zero, but to assume that this is harmful is to take a position on the correctitude of policy. Similarly with the Covid vaccines. Saying that vaccination reluctance is harmful assumes that the causes for reluctance are unfounded. But the anti-vaxxer accusations come from the same people who said that it normally takes years to produce a safe and effective vaccine, only to declare just weeks later that there had been a ‘scientific miracle’. Nearly every lab claimed to have produced a highly effective vaccine on its first attempt, and they all knew theirs would be safe without requiring the normal level of testing. Is it really that harmful and unreasonable not to believe in miracles?

So is belief in a rising threat to society from conspiracy theorists justified, or is it the growing obsession of a psychology profession that is blind to its own biases?

Introduction

Admittedly, the internet has given a platform for nutters of every stripe to projectile vomit their nonsense over an ungrateful world. They call it ‘social media’, but that’s not to say it is a good thing. Take the website 4Chan, for example. It was originally created by a bunch of nerdy adolescents so they could share their juvenile musings and engage in mischief with those who were like-minded. Often this would take the form of outrageous conspiracy theories, invented just to see how many suckers would fall for them. They didn’t believe their stories; they were just being pranksters. Or should it be said that they were frustrated journalists producing ‘Freddie ate my hamster’ headlines just to get a thrill out of seeing how much traction they could get? Of course, the problem is that they were too successful and it wasn’t long before the site became a monster, frequented by nihilistic merchants of chaos who were inspired by the juvenile high jinks and more than willing to take it to the next level. Well, that’s the internet for you.

There is no doubt that this phenomenon and the role it has played in creating groups such as Anonymous and QAnon has spooked a great many people, particularly when they see the Trumps of this world exploiting it so effectively. But still, does this justify the plethora of papers that the psychology profession currently spews out on a daily basis, each one claiming to have discovered a correlation between conspiracist ideation and one or more cognitive or emotional shortcomings? And more to the point, does it justify the poor quality of these papers and the fact that they invariably take a prejudiced stance on political matters? Why, for example, do they always fail to see that their ‘insights’ should apply not only to those who spout nonsense but also those who uncritically accept the official narratives?

Method

To illustrate the extent to which the psychology profession has become fixated upon conspiracist ideation, seemingly to the exclusion of the much more interesting question as to how society comes to accept official narratives uncritically, I took a relatively small sample of papers (just the one to be precise) and analysed its introductory section. The paper chosen for the study is titled ‘Believing in conspiracy theories: The role of emotional granularity and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies’. The introduction to that paper is quoted below in full, interspersed with commentary pointing out the obviously partisan focus that, quite frankly, runs throughout the whole of the paper.

Results

The paper’s introduction, together with my commentary, reads as follows:

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the spread of conspiracy theories on social media, particularly regarding the virus’s origin, spread, and treatment (Dow et al., 2021).

Well, having an outbreak of a novel virus just down the road from a lab researching into the creation of novel viruses will do that for you. As for theories regarding spread and treatment, I think we can all agree that the authorities were not themselves strangers to the odd moment of speculation.

Conspiracy theories are not a new phenomenon; they have been present throughout history. According to Uscinski et al. (2014), the first wave of conspiracy theories emerged shortly before the year 1900.

Really? Nothing in Shakespeare then? Or wasn’t that stuff wavy enough?

A conspiracy theory is defined as the belief that two or more actors have coordinated in secret to achieve a particular outcome of public interest but not public knowledge (Douglas & Sutton, 2023). While some conspiracy theories, like the notion that Elvis is still alive, may be harmless, others can be dangerous, leading to prejudice, violence and poor health decisions (Douglas & Sutton, 2023).

Hence the pretext for the paper’s funding. Theirs is vitally important research, don’t you know.

According to Douglas et al. (2017), there are three motives that underlie individuals’ belief in conspiracy theories: epistemic, social, and existential motives. Epistemic motives are driven by a desire for knowledge and certainty…

But I thought we were the ones who were supposed to be the merchants of doubt. If anyone is desirous of certainty it is surely those who maintain that Net Zero is necessary, achievable and certain to be effective.

..while social motives seek to maintain a positive image of the in-group by deprecating the out-group.

Like calling climate change sceptics ‘deniers’, as in Holocaust denier? I hardly think that those accused of conspiracist ideation have a monopoly when it comes to deprecating one’s out-group.

Finally, existential motives are associated with a need for safety and control (Douglas & Sutton, 2023).

So it is the climate change ‘conspiracy theorists’ that have existential motives and a need for safety and control? Are they sure they have this the right way round?

In line, previous studies have identified that individuals with a high conspiracist ideation tend to have a greater need for control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015) and moreover show heightened state and trait anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013), as well as feelings of powerlessness (i.e., the stable perception of being unable to influence an outcome through one’s action; Stern, 2000; Jolley & Douglas, 2014).

What? They can say all of this whilst ignoring the current epidemic of eco-anxiety nonsense?

Taken together, these associations suggest that conspiracy beliefs are intertwined with certain, mostly negative emotional experiences and distrustful representation of other people and groups.

But the whole point of research like this is to demonstrate how certain groups cannot be trusted with their theories. Its position is the very epitome of ‘distrustful representation of other people and groups’.

When experiencing an existential threat which raises feelings such as anxiety or uncertainty, individuals who are less proficient in emotion regulation, tend to exhibit attentional dyscontrol, and are even more likely to endorse conspiracy theories in such situations (Bardeen et al., 2017; van Prooijen, 2020).

I assume we are talking here about the theory that all the world’s best climate scientists were initially employed by Big Oil and so were forced to play down the threat of climate change. How much emotional regulation did it take to come up with that corker? But they are not talking about that one, are they? The assumption here is that people who are anxious about climate change are okay because they are proficient in emotional regulation, whereas those who fear the effects of Net Zero are not. No evidence provided.

Building upon this understanding…

Understanding?

..recent longitudinal studies conducted by Liekefett et al. (2023) have underscored the non-beneficial outcomes associated with conspiracy beliefs, noting their potential to exacerbate negative emotional experiences.

So nobody is noticing the potential for official narratives to ‘exacerbate negative emotional experiences’, then? And that, despite the fact that the same psychology profession is doing its level best to exacerbate negative emotion by using its behavioural insights. Why no ‘longitudinal studies’ into that?

Notably, these studies also identified a self-reinforcing cycle, wherein initial conspiracy beliefs predicted subsequent increases in such beliefs. In line with these findings, two recent studies have established a correlation between conspiracist ideation and difficulties in emotion regulation, suggesting that the belief in conspiracies may be a maladaptive strategy for managing negative emotions.

Difficulties in emotional regulation can go a long way towards explaining why fear-based official narratives are so effective. Is anyone looking at these correlations? I thought not.

In contrast, rather than offering a genuine solution, they provide individuals with a false sense of structure and predictability (Molenda et al., 2023; Scandurra et al., 2022).

That sounds like a perfect description of Net Zero advocacy if you ask me.

As a result, it is unsurprising that conspiracy theories emerge mainly following significant events (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017) like the COVID-19 pandemic or the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

NHS blood scandal anyone?

However, a fundamental component of emotion regulation is to recognize emotions accurately. Emotional granularity, or emotion differentiation, refers to an individual’s ability to make nuanced and fine-grained distinctions between similar emotional states (Barrett et al., 2001). Emotional granularity, has been shown to play a crucial role in the regulation process (Kalokerinos et al., 2019). It serves a fundamental role as individuals need to accurately identify the specific emotion, they are experiencing in order to effectively select an appropriate regulation strategy. Consequently, a lower level of differentiation impedes the successful regulation of emotions (Kalokerinos et al., 2019).

Yes, and that’s why societies are prone to panic.

Individuals with higher emotional granularity tend to use more differentiated and specific words to describe their emotional experience, such as “excited,” “jealous,” or “miserable,” whereas those with low emotional granularity tend to use more general terms, such as “good” or “bad.”

I just think this is a “bad” paper. Does that mean I have low emotional granularity? I could use more colourful language if you’d like, but that would still say nothing about my ability to discern my emotions. This assumption that having a good vocabulary is a good indicator of self-awareness is just junk logic.

Identifying emotions accurately is an essential first step in regulating emotions effectively (Gross, 2015). Using precise and distinct words to describe emotions, delivers important information about an emotion-eliciting event. Consequently, individuals who use more fine-grained words to express their emotional experience can manage intense (negative) emotions more effectively (Kashdan et al., 2015). This highlights the importance of accurately recognizing emotions, a skill that may be associated to an individual’s susceptibility to cognitive patterns.

Once again, just junk thinking. I don’t intend elaborating so I must be a conspiracy theorist.

Individuals who endorse conspiracy theories often exhibit a cognitive style characterized by black-and-white thinking, which involves viewing the world in stark, polarized terms. This cognitive pattern tends to oversimplify complex issues, events, and interpersonal dynamics into clear-cut categories of right versus wrong or good versus evil (Iannello et al., 2022).

It’s funny that they should say that, since we climate sceptics happen to think that climate change is a wicked problem. It is the Net Zero advocates who are oversimplifying and dichotomising.

As a result, individuals prone to black-and-white thinking may struggle to appreciate the nuances and complexities inherent in emotional experiences. Given that belief in conspiracies has been shown to be motivated by negative emotions and associated with emotional dysregulation, it is reasonable to assume that there may be a correlation between an individual’s ability to differentiate emotions and their belief in conspiracy theories.

I think that has to be the worst misuse of the word ‘reasonable’ that I have seen so far this week. If you are still following this, then well done. Personally, they lost me at ‘longitudinal studies’.

This suggests that the rigid cognitive style of black-and-white thinking, may extend to their perception and interpretation of emotions, leading to a more dichotomous view of emotional experiences.

Dichotomous view of emotional experiences? Who writes this nonsense? I find my views of this paper are getting increasingly dichotomous.

Thus, in the current study, we hypothesized that individuals with lower emotional granularity (i.e., considering emotions as either good or bad) would be more likely to endorse conspiracist ideation. Further, we performed an exploratory analysis pertaining to whether conspiracist ideation is differentially related to performance-based and self-reported measures of emotional granularity.

And what about performing an exploratory analysis pertaining to the uncritical acceptance of authorised narratives? Oh, I forgot, they’re psychologists.

Finally, we aimed to extend the existing literature on dysfunctional emotion regulation and conspiracist ideation by incorporating additional functional emotion regulation strategies.

And I wish they hadn’t. The last thing we need is additional functional emotion regulation strategies.

Discussion

I was planning to undertake a similar commentary on the paper’s concluding statements, but I suspect that the reader has suffered enough already. Suffice it to say, the same obsession with conspiracy ideation and a blinkered application of psychology insights is on show. The only thing I wish to add is that this is a paper that is every bit as half-baked as all the others that ‘discovered’ quite different correlations aligned with supposed conspiracist ideation. But let us not beat about the bush here. The epicentre of science’s replication crisis can be found in psychology and and it is no wonder when we are presented with papers such as this. The only saving grace is that the authors did not use MTurk, preferring instead to base their ground-breaking conclusions on a study of a small group of psychology students who, according to the study, ‘scored, on average, low in conspiracist ideation, which may be due to the sample being highly educated’. Yes, and also highly female and left-wing liberal in outlook, no doubt. No sampling error there, methinks not.

So does any of this answer the question as to whether conspiracist ideation is on the increase? Not really, but what it does illustrate is the obsession that the psychology profession has with the problem and the quite bizarre failure of the same people to see how meaningless their correlation studies are if one completely ignores the psychology behind an uncritical acceptance of official narratives. Even when viewed in their best light, an argument can be made for using ‘glut’ as the collective noun for psychology papers. But when seen in the light of the psychology profession’s blind acceptance of the climate science consensus, and its belief in everything emanating from the Guardian, an argument can be made for using the same term to describe any single psychology paper written on the subject of conspiracy theorists. ‘Glutinous’ was certainly a word that came to my mind when reading this particular paper.

In summary therefore, I can say that this paper was both bad and glutinous. So I guess there is hope for me yet. All I needed to do was put my ’emotionally dysregulated’ mind to it in order to discover my inner granularity.

Acknowledgements

Jit, for drawing my attention to the MTurk problem.

Conflicts of Interest Statement

The author declares that he is nothing but a Big Oil shill in the pay of the Koch brothers.