One of the greatest causes of concern to those who see existential peril in the climate records is the failure of others to act as though they share that understanding. Many experts, particularly from the fields of psychology and sociology, have sought to provide scientific explanations for this supposed perversity. Some say it is due to a myriad of cognitive biases causing the human mind to miscalculate risk. Others seek answers in demography, claiming that political leanings or having certain backgrounds, or even moving in certain circles, gets in the way of critical thinking. Still others put it all down to being led astray by bad actors who have learnt to exploit our dopamine system by rewarding belief in alluring conspiracy theories. Then, of course, there are the merchants of doubt; the shady influencers who use their playbooks to misinform the public and discredit the scientists. And maybe it’s just a lack of morality.

All of these arguments are ripe for challenge, but the ‘explanation’ I choose to concentrate upon today is one I find particularly fascinating because it seems to be underpinned by sound mathematics and logic. For some, the perfect explanation for the failure to act appropriately in the face of a climate change ‘crisis’ can be found in a branch of mathematics called game theory.

Game theory, as we know it today, had its origins in the canonical text Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, written in 1944 by mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern. The intention was to demonstrate how adherence to a set of mathematically determined rules could optimise one’s chances of success when engaged in the competitive pursuit of a shared goal. Central to the idea were the concepts of the rational player and economic utility. Economic utility was deemed the measure of success and, when playing the ‘game’, the rational agent would always adopt a strategy designed to maximise their own economic utility. In particular, von Neumann and Morgenstern demonstrated that a successful, rational player engaged in a zero-sum game would gravitate towards a strategy called minimax, in which one minimises the maximum payout one’s opponent may achieve.

Unfortunately, it can be shown that in certain circumstances two rational players employing the minimax strategy will both end up underperforming in their pursuit of economic utility. This is exemplified by the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. In the game’s setup, two prisoners are guilty of a crime but they may hope to affect their punishment depending upon whether or not they betray the other. Each prisoner faces a choice: confess (defect) or stay silent (cooperate); the best individual payoff comes from confessing when the other stays silent, but mutual defection results in a moderate sentence, while mutual cooperation yields the best collective result (a short sentence for both). The lesson to be learnt from the prisoner’s dilemma is that sometimes cooperation is the best strategy, but gaining it when acting rationally in one’s self-interest is not straightforward.

The international politics of climate change have been characterised as a game of prisoner’s dilemma, i.e. a game in which countries that would wish to act unilaterally in their self-interest are having to co-operate in order to achieve a greater good. The best global outcome is for everyone to co-operate and accept their share of the burden in tackling climate change. The temptation, however, is for countries to defect and reject their carbon reduction responsibilities in order to boost their industrial and commercial well-being. Global targets are thereby missed, and we all fry. At least, that is how the Guardian has put it:

The fundamentals of the climate change are simple: the Earth’s finite capacity to absorb additional CO2 produced by burning fossil fuels, and the self-centred motivations of governments, businesses, and people which leads them to try and use as much of this capacity as possible. Simply put, more CO2 produces more wealth. Consequently, what is best for the individual is not best for the group. Somehow these two incentives need to align. One way would be for all 197 nations to cooperate in working out how to allocate carbon emissions.

Having described the nature of the dilemma in game theoretic terms, the Guardian then sees a solution to the problem in another game theory discovery: playing a strategy of tit-for-tat, in which one matches the opponent’s move, can lead to a mutually beneficial outcome, particularly if someone starts the game with the ‘right’ move:

In essence, this is a simple and robust strategy. Along with tit-for-tat. Play nice with someone and they return the favour. Upset or hurt them and expect consequences. Social scientist Robert Axelrod discovered tit-for-tat as an effective strategy in repeated social games in the 1980s. It’s not the best strategy for all interactions, but it’s robust and lends itself to modification. With regards to climate change, the hope is that if likeminded people within a group can agree to limit greenhouse gas emissions, then a group can make similar agreements with other groups. Regional agreements can help scaffold international agreements.

However, before we get too carried away here and attempt to explain everything in game theoretic terms, it is worth dwelling upon game theory’s numerous limitations.

Firstly, the concept of the rational player has to be carefully considered. In game theory, rationality isn’t psychological; it is a formal concept focusing on how choices align with goals and comply with the logic of completeness and transitivity. Game theory cannot tell you how people will behave in the real world because it isn’t dealing with real agents; it deals with mathematical constructs.

Secondly, game theory assumes that utility is an economic concern. Game players are supposed to value economic success and nothing else. In the real world, metrics for success can take a variety of forms, including, for example, a game-player who values above all else the taking of a moral high ground.

Thirdly, the prisoner’s dilemma and tit-for-tat are relevant when two players are playing a zero-sum game. However, most examples of conflict and cooperation in the real world involve multiple players engaged in games that are not zero-sum.

Fourthly, when multiple players are involved, it is not uncommon for each player to believe themselves to be involved in a different game to the one perceived by their opponents. This is particularly true when each play has a different set of values used to define success. In such circumstances, it is very difficult to arrive at a common set of rules by which to bootstrap cooperation. If one is playing football against someone who believes the game to be rugby, concepts such as handball and offside tend to be malleable.

All of these problems serve to render the Guardian’s simplistic analysis somewhat useless. The reality is that game theory has very little to teach us about the politics of climate change and how best to play it, because even the concept of rationality cannot be easily pinned down. To see this, one only has to look at the UK’s gameplay.

One way of looking at it would be to assume that the UK is aware that it is playing prisoner’s dilemma and assumes the rest of the world has the same understanding. The logic would be that, in refusing to defect and selfishly protect its own economy, others may be encouraged to follow suit. This would be an irrational move in game theory terms but it certainly would achieve a greater good if other nations — assured that they would not be alone — were to follow suit. Unfortunately, this hasn’t happened and there seems no prospect that it ever shall. Instead, the gameplay is now dominated by a cabal of defectors that collectively accounts for the majority of CO2 emissions. If this had been the UK’s logic, then maintaining its strategy in the light of evident failure would now have to be seen as a case of emphatic irrationality, no matter how one looks at it.

In a similar vein, the UK may be endeavouring a naïve attempt at tit-for-tat, in which its noble gesture of fossil fuel self-denial would inspire other nations to reciprocate, thereby providing the ‘scaffold for international agreement’. This would qualify as a rational move in strict game theory terms but it still looks like a decidedly irrational move once one sees how other nations are playing the game. Unless, of course, the aspiration is world leadership for its own sake — in whatever form that may take. The forlorn attempt to re-establish the prestige of a fast-sinking nation, whilst inflating the egos of those at the helm, may be all there is too it. That being the case, the UK government’s posturing at the COPs would actually be a rational gameplay, since it would be aligned with the intended goal, albeit at the cost of minimising every sensible, alternative metric of utility.

There again, it is feasible that the UK government actually believes its own claims that Net Zero makes perfect economic sense, irrespective of whether other nations defect to the dark side of fossil-fuelled economic growth. In that case, the UK must be seen as a highly rational but profoundly incompetent player, basing its gameplay upon a raft of fatally flawed premises, such as the security of off-shore windfarms, the myth of reliable and cheap intermittent energy supplies, the idea that having to retain expensive backup systems is an acceptable ‘investment’, the promise of a green jobs bonanza that only seems to be benefitting China, dependence upon technologies that are controlled by hostile nations, the protection of rural environments through their industrialisation, and many more.

But perhaps the most problematic aspect of the UK’s strategy is the failure to recognise that not everyone is even playing the same game. Whilst for some nations climate change politics may be all about saving the world from climate chaos, it is quite clear that others are taking it as an opportunity to redistribute wealth as part of a bid to implement so-called climate justice. As explained here, this duality of gameplay is coded into Article 4.7 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and its division of nations into two groups – the developed and developing countries — each of which is allowed to play by fundamentally different rules. Tackling climate change and effecting climate justice are supposed to go hand in hand, but that has proven to be a naïve idea destined to deliver ever increasing global CO2 emissions. It is the ultimate irrational gameplay, since climate justice actions have proven to be entirely unaligned with climate mitigation goals.

One can continue attempting to analyse the mess of climate change politics in game theory terms but the bottom line is that game theory cannot offer any particularly clear insights because it deals with a platonic world rationality where conflict and cooperation obey hardwired rules. The reality is a cacophony of conflict driven by players that, rational or not, at times don’t even seem to know what they want to achieve by playing the game. There is no prisoner’s dilemma, just a world that is ultimately imprisoned by intractable ideological differences and a fossil fuel dependency that is far too ingrained to be escaped within the timescales demanded by the game. And there is no tit-for-tat on offer either, just a Convention that is a load of tat and politicians that are just a bunch of…did I mention Ed Miliband earlier?